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10/30/2003
China's Military, Part I
Each year, the U.S. Department of Defense must submit a report
to Congress on the current and future military strategy of the
People’s Republic of China. Herewith are some snippets from
the July 2003 update.
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The Department of Defense (DoD) has identified three gaps in
U.S. knowledge about Chinese military power. First is China’s
military power juxtaposed to that of Taiwan. There is much
more the United States can learn about both sides’ ideas of
statecraft, their approaches to the use of force, their perceived
vulnerabilities, and their preferred operational methods, as well
as about the political and military organizations that produce
military assessments and plans. Second are such intangible
Chinese capabilities as logistics, doctrine, and command and
control. Finally, although DoD has highlighted Beijing’s greater
interest in coercion and pre-emption strategies and identified
emerging methods of warfare that appear likely to be
increasingly important in the future – particularly missiles and
information warfare – it is difficult to assess confidently how
these developments will affect the overall military balance.
--Younger military leaders now dominating the Central Military
Commission (CMC) of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and
are better prepared to further modernization; as a group, they
have operational experience in weapons integration, logistics,
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence.
--Chinese doctrine continues to emphasize surprise, deception,
and shock effect in the opening phase of a campaign. China is
exploring coercive strategies designed to bring Taipei to terms
quickly.
--Announced Chinese spending on the military is $20 billion,
though DoD believes it to be as high as $65 billion. Annual
spending could increase in real terms three-to four-fold by 2020.
--Beijing’s military training exercises increasingly focus on the
United States as an adversary.
The PLA continues to focus on training to counter a more
militarily advanced adversary and to incorporate the ‘Three
Attacks and Three Defense’ initiative – air defense training that
concentrates on attacking stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and
helicopters, while defending against precision strikes, electronic
warfare, and enemy reconnaissance.
--China has approximately 450 short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs) already in its deployed inventory. This number is
expected to increase by over 75 missiles per year for the next few
years. The accuracy and lethality of this force also are
increasing.
--All of China’s known SRBM assets are believed to be based in
the Nanjing Military Region opposite Taiwan. The number of
conventional ballistic missiles deployed opposite Taiwan is
expected to increase substantially over the next several years.
--China reportedly has developed electronic warfare variants of
several of its larger aircraft, and may have several programs
underway to deploy new standoff and escort jammers on
bombers, transports, tactical aircraft, and unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) platforms.
--China has been upgrading its air facilities along the Taiwan
Strait.
--Air combat tactics continue to evolve and pilot training is
becoming more advanced.
*Ed. The Navy doesn’t seem to be as far as along as the other
branches, just by reading the DoD report, though its amphibious
attack capability has improved. Air defense systems also don’t
appear to be as far along as the offensive missile capabilities.
--The PLA has been downsizing the number of army divisions
for the purposes of freeing more resources for modernization.
--Despite a large scale modernization program, China still lags
behind western standards for integrating and controlling complex
joint military operations.
--China is spending substantial resources on information warfare.
Special reserve units are active in several cities developing
“pockets of excellence” that could gradually develop the
expertise and expand to form a corps of “network warriors” able
to defend China’s telecommunications, command, and
information networks, while uncovering vulnerabilities in foreign
networks.
--Beijing is focused on technology and design development
mainly through cooperation with Western companies and by
reverse engineering. China’s latest systems are significantly
improved over their predecessors.
--China is procuring state-of-the-art technology to improve its
intercept, direction finding, and jamming capabilities. It also
may be developing jammers, which could be used against Global
Positioning System (GPS) receivers.
China is pursuing a robust research and development program for
laser weapons. Chinese scientists have also written about – and
China probably has in place – a program to develop explosively
driven radiofrequency (sic) weapons technology that potentially
could be used in missile warheads or aircraft bombs.
--Beijing may have acquired high-energy laser equipment that
could be used in the development of ground-based anti-satellite
weapons.
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China’s grand strategy attempts to balance two often competing
objectives. One is developing what it calls the nation’s
comprehensive national power” (CNP). The other is exploiting
to maximum advantage the existing “strategic configuration of
power” or “shi,” to preserve national independence and enable
China to build “momentum” in its effort to increase national
power.
CNP is the concept by which China’s strategic planners evaluate
and measure national standing in relations to other nations.
Beijing states that its current number-one strategic priority is
economic development. In addition to the important function it
plays in raising living standards, economic development is
regarded as an important step in gradually increasing China’s
international leverage and military modernization. An
economically stronger China also, over time, would enhance its
relative CNP and could allocate its resources for a more
favorable “strategic configuration of power.”
China’s leaders believe that three essential conditions – national
unity, stability, and sovereignty – must exist if China is to
survive and develop as a nation. Among these conditions,
Beijing judges that national unity is the most important.
Beijing’s preoccupation with maintaining unity is driven by
China’s internal and external security environment and national
condition, historical experience, national goals, and, perhaps
most importantly, challenges to the CCP’s legitimacy.
Ensuring domestic stability and a secure international
environment is crucial to Beijing’s national development
strategy. Senior leaders currently are focused on the short-term
task of ensuring regime stability and maintaining domestic order
and leadership control while dealing with several sources of
internal unrest and instability. Chinese leaders also believe they
must maintain conditions of state sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
Should China become involved in a major war, the relative
priority it places on its national goals is likely to change. Both
Deng and Jiang indicated that one of China’s war aims would be
to end the war on favorable terms as soon as possible so that
Beijing could refocus on the goal of developing national power.
China has had a longstanding geopolitical challenge in
maintaining control over the heartland of China and major
elements of “Inner Asia.” It also has sought to secure the vast
periphery of coastal and land boundaries, as well as maritime
territory in a region populated by traditional rivals and enemies.
From Beijing’s perspective, strategic ambiguity – including
strategic denial and deception – is a mechanism to influence the
policies of foreign governments and the opinions of the general
public and elites in other countries. China’s leaders believe that
ambiguity and stressing the “just nature” of Chinese actions have
the effect of “drawing out” those who oppose and those who
support China’s interests abroad. Once China’s leaders make the
distinction between friend and foe, they can develop and tailor
themes to counter opposition and advance their overall agenda.
Moreover, such distinctions position China to reward “friends”
abroad, or alternatively, punish “enemies” to enhance its own
position in the balance of power.
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I’ll have more next week.
Brian Trumbore
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