08/07/2003
Post-Saddam, Part I
[Posted early due to travel.]
Writing in the July / August edition of Foreign Affairs, Kenneth Pollack, Middle East policy director for the Brookings Institution, weighs in on the topic of oil and overall security in the Persian Gulf, post-Saddam.
“U.S. interests do not center on whether gas is $2 or $3 at the pump, or whether Exxon gets contracts instead of Lukoil or Total. Nor do they depend on the amount of oil that the United States itself imports from the Persian Gulf or anywhere else. The reason the United States has a legitimate and critical interest in seeing that Persian Gulf oil continues to flow copiously and relatively cheaply is simply that the global economy built over the last 50 years rests on a foundation of inexpensive, plentiful oil, and if that foundation were removed, the global economy would collapse.”
25 percent of the world’s oil production comes from the Persian Gulf; Saudi Arabia alone being responsible for 15 percent, which most expect to increase due to its huge reserves, with the Persian Gulf, overall, having 2/3s of the world’s proven future supply.
“So the fact that the United States does not import most of its oil from the Persian Gulf is irrelevant: if Saudi oil production were to vanish, the price of oil in general would shoot through the ceiling, destroying the American economy along with everybody else’s.”
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“The three main problems likely to bedevil Persian Gulf security over the next several years will be Iraq’s security dilemma, Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and potential internal unrest in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.”
With regards to Iraq, a future problem is the size of its military.
“Any Iraq that is strong enough to balance and contain Iran will inevitably be capable of overrunning Kuwait and Saudi Arabia… Like post-war Germany and Japan, post-Saddam Iraq will almost certainly be forbidden from developing weapons of mass destruction ever again….(But) if Iraq is not going to be allowed to possess WMD, then it will have to obtain some kind of credible external security guarantee or maintain substantial – and threatening – conventional military capabilities.”
As for Iran, an obvious threat to Iraq:
“Iran’s hard-liners maintain power in part by stoking popular fears that the United States seeks to rule the country and control its policies, and so aggressive containment or active counterproliferation measures could play right into their hands. The Iranian pardox, in other words, is that preparing to deal with the worst-case scenario of Iranian hard-liners possessing nuclear weapons might very well make that scenario more likely.”
Thankfully, Iran’s conventional military, for now, is weak.
“So the risk is not so much conventional military invasion (of Iraq or other Persian Gulf states) as attempts to shut down tanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz as a method of blackmail or foment insurrections in neighboring countries.”
Pollack adds:
“Unfortunately, the security posture that would best deter future Iranian aggression – sizable American forces dispersed throughout the Persian Gulf – is the worst option of all from the perspective of dealing with the third major problem, terrorism and internal instability in the states of the GCC.”
I disagree. The United States needs to be in the region for years to come and in sizable numbers.
Pollack’s point, though, is that the leaders of the GCC want to “minimize domestic discontent,” and desire a minimal U.S. presence. He does correctly add that many in the U.S. military establishment desire the same thing, a goal of shedding its burdens. Continuing:
“On the other hand, the mere fact that the Persian Gulf states are so enamored of this strategy ought to give American planners pause. With the exception of Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion, most of these countries have shown a distressing determination over the years to ignore their problems – both external and internal – rather than confront them.”
So, Pollack then comes around to your editor’s stance.
“A reduced U.S. military and political presence, in turn, would weaken Washington’s ability to press its local allies to make the tough choices they need to for their own long-term well-being.”
The solution, as Pollack then surmises, is a sort of security “condominium,” including Iraq and the GCC, but then GCC unity may be a pipedream and Pollack once again says U.S. forces throughout the region must be reduced.
Well, since he’s having trouble making up his mind, again, I say keep the heat on. But at the same time the American people need to understand why such a long-term commitment is required, and this in turn calls for a president who isn’t afraid to use some of his extensive political capital for the good of us all.
We’ll continue this topic next week, Aug. 14.
Brian Trumbore
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