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12/11/2003
Review: China / Taiwan / U.S.
Every few years it seems appropriate to review the genesis of the
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. Today, more than ever, the
relationship between China, Taiwan and the United States could
best be described as at a crossroads.
I have written in my “Week in Review” columns that I do not see
the current war of words between Beijing and Taipei as
escalating into military action, but as Taiwan’s presidential
election draws near, next March, the situation certainly bears
watching. And this week Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao is in
Washington to make it clear to President Bush where his
government stands on the issue of Taiwan’s potential dreams of
independence.
Essentially, Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian wants to hold a
referendum in conjunction with the election on March 20 calling
on China to remove the 500 missiles targeting Taiwan. Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao said the mainland can’t accept that, calling it
a first step towards declaring independence while threatening to
use force to stop any such movement.
For his part, President Bush told Taiwan to drop the referendum
idea due to the fact the administration doesn’t want another crisis
in this part of Asia when Washington needs Beijing’s help on
resolving the North Korean nuclear weapons issue.
I’ll leave it at that and use “Week in Review” for further
comments.
[The following is taken from pieces I wrote in 1999 and 2001.]
At the end of World War II, the Communists in China, led by
Mao Zedong, fought with the ruling Nationalist forces under the
leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Mao, a brilliant strategist,
overcame his basic lack of resources and led his peasant army to
victory over the resource rich, U.S.-backed, Nationalist army.
By April 1949, Mao was in control of most of the major
provinces and soon thereafter Chiang was driven off the
mainland onto the island of Formosa (Taiwan). Chiang then
established the Republic of China (ROC), while in Beijing, Mao
declared the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on September 21,
1949.
Two days after the announcement of the formation of the PRC,
U.S. President Truman announced, “We have evidence an atomic
explosion occurred in the USSR.” Now the U.S. faced twin
threats and many Americans felt traitors in our own country had
supplied Stalin with the bomb, while others had allowed his
puppet Mao to defeat Chiang’s Nationalists. It was also assumed
that Mao would be under the direct influence of Stalin.
In a speech in early 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson
spoke of the new line of containment and mentioned that he felt
it was certain that Stalin and Mao would quarrel, but he didn’t
note Taiwan, Indochina, or Korea, appearing to exclude them
from the U.S. defense perimeter. Stalin took this as an invitation
to create mischief in Korea, in part as a way of teaching China
where its true interests should lie.
So Stalin wanted a limited proxy war in Korea, as in a little push
across the 38th parallel. But North Korea’s Kim Il Sung took
Stalin’s overture as a green light for a massive invasion of the
South, which he launched on June 25, 1950.
As a result of the Korean conflict, Taiwan became a far larger
issue and the U.S. adopted a firm stance. And with China’s
subsequent involvement in the war, the need to deter Mao
became quite clear.
What was also clear as the 1950s unfolded was the fact that
China’s bark was bigger than its bite. It was the American
military link with Taiwan and Japan that deterred Beijing from
acting on its ambition to grab Taiwan. In the 1960s events in
Indochina took center state and finally in 1971, the world
received word that President Nixon was going to China in early
1972.
The trip took place in late February. Nixon and Chinese Premier
Chou En-lai signed a communiqu , an important part of which
dealt with Taiwan. In his book “In the Arena,” Nixon writes:
“Instead of trying to paper over differences with mushy,
meaningless, diplomatic gobbledygook, each side expressed its
position on the issues where we disagreed. On the (painful) issue
of Taiwan, we stated the obvious fact that the Chinese on the
mainland and on Taiwan agreed that there was one China. We
expressed our position that the differences between the two
should be settled peacefully. And on the great issue which made
this historic rapprochement possible, the communiqu stated that
neither nation ‘should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region
and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of
countries to establish such hegemony.’”
Most historians would agree that Nixon’s recognition of China
was his finest hour. And Taiwan was not sacrificed. But even
Nixon couldn’t complete the full normalization of U.S. ties with
China, which would have to wait until 1979 and the Carter
administration.
By the time President Carter took office the vast majority of
nations in the world had begun to recognize China as the
legitimate leader of all Chinese people. Taiwan had been
expelled from the U.N. in 1971 and the country didn’t help its
own cause as the island was ruled, first, by dictator Chiang Kai-
shek and later his equally bad son. Political reform was slow in
coming with democracy really only taking hold over the past 9-
11 years.
At the time of Carter’s inauguration, the president was anxious to
formally normalize relations with China, but at the same time he
didn’t want to sell out Taiwan. The U.S. had a Mutual Defense
Treaty with Taipei and it had troops stationed on the island.
While it was assumed that the troops would be withdrawn, Carter
wanted a liaison office in Taiwan as a pretext to normalizing
relations with Beijing. But newly elected Chinese Communist
Party boss Deng Xiao-Ping said “No.” Deng felt it would
promote the image of two Chinas; one China, one Taiwan.
Meanwhile, Carter had a war on his hands with his staff,
especially between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, as the two fought over
influence. Bottom line, Zbig almost blew it.
Deng wanted no further arms sales to Taiwan, after allowing for
those already in the pipeline. He had been prepared to offer
Taiwan near total autonomy, granting them its own political and
economic system – even its own military – but under the banner
of one China, with national sovereignty residing in Beijing.
“One country, two systems.”
But while China thought the U.S. had agreed to no further arms
sales to Taiwan, President Carter and Zbig thought they would be
allowed limited sales of defensive weapons. So when Carter was
set to announce the historic agreement with China, Deng
received word of the U.S. understanding on weapons sales and
requested an emergency meeting with the U.S. representative to
China, Leonard Woodcock. Carter had to be able to reassure
Congress that limited defensive arms sales would continue.
Deng disagreed. He argued that Taiwan wouldn’t have the
incentive to go to the negotiating table, and eventually China
would have to use force to recover Taiwan.
But in the end, Deng suddenly gave in and allowed the sale.
Carter went before the American people to discuss the deal.
Conservatives like Ronald Reagan and Barry Goldwater
slammed it as a sellout of Taiwan. Former President Ford,
however, supported it. An angry Congress then transformed the
“Act” to the Taiwan Relations Act, which included a strong
security commitment to Taiwan. Relations with China, however,
were now normalized.
Since 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act has guided our policy. It
is purposefully nebulous. It doesn’t clearly state that the U.S.
would immediately come to Taiwan’s aid if the island came
under attack. But it is strongly implied that the U.S. would with
inclusion of the term “grave consequences,” while not revealing
just what those would be.
Hott Spotts returns December 18.
Brian Trumbore
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