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03/18/2004
March / April 2003
PBS’ “Frontline” program recently had a superb narrative of the
initial days of the Iraq War.
Operation Iraqi Freedom a look back
Spring 2003
March 6 President Bush announces that time is running out on
the UN inspections process and on Saddam Hussein.
March 17 Bush delivers final ultimatum: “Saddam Hussein and
his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to go will
result in military conflict commenced at a time of our choosing.”
March 19 The coalition plans to begin the invasion with a
spectacular opening “decapitation” strike, targeting the top 55
men in the Iraqi leadership. But then there is a sudden change of
plans, as CIA Director George Tenet has received a tip on where
Saddam would be that evening. A surprise strike against Saddam
is authorized instead of the original plan of attack. The U.S. hits
the Dora Farm complex where Saddam and members of the
family are supposed to be, but he’s not there.
March 20 Invasion begins. Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld is upbeat. “There will be Iraqis who offer not only to
help us but to help liberate the country and to free the Iraqi
people. More of them there are, the greater the chance that the
war will be limited and less broad.”
March 21 The coalition launches its bombing campaign in
Baghdad. “Shock and awe” is designed to convince the Iraqi
people that it is safe to overthrow the regime.
American commanders advancing across the Kuwait border
report Iraqi regular forces are simply falling apart, taking off
uniforms and disappearing among the civilian population.
British reach outskirts of Basra but are met with resistance from
regular troops and Fedayeen.
March 22 The forward elements of the 3rd infantry are roughly
halfway to Baghdad.
March 23 U.S. forces meet with resistance around Nasiriya. 11
Americans die, 7 are taken prisoner, when Fedayeen attacks
maintenance unit. In a separate attack, 18 Marines die in the
same region. With the toll of 29 that day, hopes fade that Iraqi
people will help coalition overthrow Saddam.
March 25 Due largely to a fierce sandstorm, the advance on
Baghdad stalls. Back in Washington, armchair generals begin
complaining there aren’t enough troops in the theatre.
April 2...Members of the 3rd infantry advance into the vital
Karbala Gap and the chemical attack they fear doesn’t
materialize.
April 3-4 Troops from 3rd I-D reach Saddam International
Airport. Not quite ready for final assault on Baghdad, fearing the
remnants of the Republican Guard, but it turns out key Guard
units are positioned south of Baghdad. Americans had bypassed
them and didn’t know it. The Guard is dealt with as the Iraqis
are caught by surprise and have their tanks pointed the wrong
way. The feared Medina Division melts away.
April 5 Back in Basra, British are tightening the noose around
the city. Acting on an intelligence tip, F-16s go after “Chemical
Ali,” but the strike misses him. Nonetheless, it’s a turning point
because citizens of Basra believe he is dead.
April 7 Marines storm eastern boundary of Baghdad. Then
Col. Perkins “Thunder Run” heads straight downtown, meeting
the only real resistance. 19 days after crossing the Kuwait
border, the Americans have penetrated to the heart of the regime.
That same afternoon the Americans get another intelligence tip
on Saddam; he is in the Al Mansour district in the west of
Baghdad. Intelligence is off again. 18 civilians are killed.
April 9 Statue of Saddam is pulled down. As American
columns continue to roll into Baghdad, there are few of the
triumphal scenes the coalition hoped for. Looting spreads
quickly.
April 11 Secretary Rumsfeld comments on the looting, saying
“freedom’s untidy and free people are free to make mistakes and
commit crimes and do bad things ”
May 1 President Bush lands on the deck of the USS Abraham
Lincoln and announces the official end of combat operations in
Iraq. But the insurgency begins to grow.
Less than 150 American troops died in the allied invasion. Over
400 have perished since May 1.
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Interviews with key American leaders What happened?
Secretary of the Army Thomas White (5/01-5/03)
Q: What was the mood in the Pentagon and their expectation of
what was likely to happen once troops actually crossed the
border into Iraq?
White: I think the expectation was that there would be mass
surrenders; that the combat phase of the operation would not be
too difficult; that, at grassroots level, this would be viewed as a
war of liberation .
The view on the military side, I think, was far more pessimistic.
We were very concerned that there wouldn’t be sufficient
boots on the ground after the operation to provide for security
and get on with the stabilization activities.
Q: Paul Wolfowitz, also Donald Rumsfeld, were very
outspoken in criticizing the army’s views on troop levels needed.
White: There’s a certain amount of arrogance to both of them in
this regard
Our view was that they were going to be terribly wrong .I
mean, here you have a population which is fractured, with the
Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Shias. It’s a huge country. It’s been
ruled with an iron fist by a tyrant. As soon as you take that iron
fist off the population and don’t replace it with an obvious
presence of law and order, I don’t think it was that hard to divine
what was going to occur.
Q: [What was your view of the events following the toppling of
Saddam’s statue and the looting that ensued?]
White: To a degree, the infrastructure of the country was
effectively dismantled before our very eyes on CNN. It really
crystallizes the completely ineffective view of what would be
required in postwar Iraq. It set the tone.
Q: What were the key lessons learned from this war, for you?
White: In the world that we face, the combat phase may be the
easiest part; B, that what follows the combat phase is where most
of the strategic objectives will be achieved or not achieved and,
therefore, it deserves as much planning and attention as the
combat phase does. Three, until you’ve done that, don’t start the
operation in the first place. Fourth, it’s going to take you a long
time and a great deal of effort if you get into anything the scale
that we’ve gotten into in Iraq. So you’d better be ready for it.
Q: Are you personally angry about the way the postwar’s been
mishandled?
White: I think we should all be angry.
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Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan, commander of combined allied
land forces.
Q: The troops level you had – was it something that you and all
of your senior field commanders were totally happy with?
McKiernan: [You never get everything you want.] But I will tell
you unequivocally that the force I had as the ground component
commander were the forces that I asked for and were sufficient
to do the mission that I was given
[McKiernan complained about the force ‘flow,’ however.]
The transition from major combat operations to subsequent
combat operations and stability and support operations was so
fast, and you had no Iraq institutions to (bring) into this
(process). No Iraqi army, no Iraqi police. The prisoners (were)
let out of prison. No local or national government organization.
Ministries didn’t exist. So into that power vacuum, (having)
some of these later-flowing capabilities (quicker) would have
been (helpful).
Q: As a general trying to organize the practical campaign in the
field, how useful, comprehensive, and specific was the
intelligence that you had?
McKiernan: We had superb electronic intelligence. We knew the
terrain, we had absolutely first-rate terrain products. What we
didn’t have (enough) of was human intelligence. And you don’t
just develop human intelligence overnight That requires assets
that work over long lead times. So we (had) a deficit (of) human
intelligence (in) Iraq
Q: Did the generals win the war and the politicians lose the
peace?
McKiernan: Soldiers and small units won decisive combat
operations and removed the Baath and regime. Nobody has lost
the war. The campaign continues. The war had changed
dramatically in nature and we’re into what I call the back end of
the campaign, which is a combination of combat actions, of
security and stability operations, of peacekeeping operations, of
infrastructure repair, of transition to the Iraqi leadership and
ministries and governance. Nobody has lost that war.
---
Lt. Gen. William Scott Wallace, commander of U.S. Army’s 5th
Corps.
Q: When did your planning for this conflict actually begin?
Wallace: Our planning in the 5th Corps actually started in
November of 2001 when we were given direction to start looking
at the possibility of operations in Iraq.
Q: General Franks was happy with the troop levels Were you?
Wallace: I guess that, as summer (2002) arrived, I wasn’t real
comfortable with the troop levels.
Q: What are your memories of the period of the sandstorms?
Wallace: The weather really sucked. It’s hard to describe You
could literally not see more than about 30 or 40 feet with your
naked eye. The whole area was engulfed by this orangish,
reddish haze – it looks like one of these old science fiction
movies of folks walking around the surface of Mars. I mean,
there’s just red haze, and then it started raining. And because of
all the particles suspended in the air, as the rain hit the ground it
was actually a drop of mud, and it began to cake on the vehicles.
Q: The military did their job. They won the war in three weeks.
In the postwar, have the politicians mishandled it?
Wallace: The military did their job in three weeks. I give no
credit to the politicians for detailed Phase Four (the
reconstruction of Iraq) planning. But I don’t think that we, the
military, did a very good job of anticipating (that) either. I don’t
think that any of us either could have or did anticipate the total
collapse of this regime and the psychological impact it had on the
entire nation. When we arrived in Baghdad, everybody had gone
home The regime officials were gone; the folks that provided
security of the ministry buildings had gone; the folks that
operated the water treatment plants and the electricity grid and
the water purification plants were gone. There were no bus
drivers, no taxi drivers; everybody just went home.
I for one did not anticipate our presence being such a traumatic
influence on the entire population. We expected there to be
some degree of infrastructure left in the city, in terms of
intellectual infrastructure, in terms of running the city
infrastructure, in terms of running the government infrastructure.
But what in fact happened, which was unanticipated at least in
my mind, is that when we decapitated the regime, everything
below it fell apart. I’m not sure that we could have anticipated
that.
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[Source: pbs.org]
Hott Spotts returns March 25.
Brian Trumbore
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