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05/19/2005
Josef Stalin and North Korea
About ten years ago I purchased CNN’s video series “Cold War”
and I have to admit I haven’t touched it. [I’m a sucker for these.]
But the other day I was perusing an accompanying booklet that
contained some old documents, many of which had been
retrieved from the Soviet archives during Mikhail Gorbachev’s
glasnost. What follows is a letter that Josef Stalin wrote to North
Korea’s Kim Il Sung about Chinese entry in the Korean War.
The date is October 8, 1950, the war having started that June.
The reason why I’m bringing it up now is because I believe there
are some parallels to today and the predicament the United States
is in with Kim’s son, Kim Jong il.
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Comrade Kim Il Sung!
My reply has been delayed because of my consultations with the
Chinese comrades, which took several days. On 1 October, I
sent a letter to Mao Zedong, inquiring whether he could dispatch
to Korea immediately at least five or six divisions under the
cover of which our Korean comrades could form reserve troops.
Mao Zedong replied with a refusal, saying that he did not want to
draw the USSR into the war, that the Chinese army was weak in
technical terms, and that the war could cause great dissatisfaction
in China. I replied to him by the following letter.
“I considered it possible to turn to You with the question of five-
six Chinese volunteer divisions because I was well aware of a
number of statements made by the leading Chinese comrades
regarding their readiness to move several armies in support of the
Korean comrades if the enemy were to cross the 38th parallel. I
explained the readiness of the Chinese comrades to send troops
to Korea by the fact that China was interested in preventing the
danger of the transformation of Korea into a USA springboard or
a bridgehead for a future militaristic Japan against China.
“While raising before You the question of dispatching troops to
Korea, I considered 5-6 divisions a minimum, not a maximum,
and I was proceeding from the following considerations of an
international character:
1) the USA, as the Korean events showed, is not ready at present
for a big war;
2) Japan, whose militaristic potential has not yet been restored, is
not capable of rendering military assistance to the Americans;
3) the USA will be compelled to yield in the Korean question to
China behind which stands its ally, the USSR, and will have to
agree to such terms of the settlement of the Korean question that
would be favorable to Korea and that would not give the enemies
a possibility to transform Korea into their springboard;
4) for the same reason, the USA will not only have to abandon
Taiwan, but also to reject the idea of a separate peace with the
Japanese reactionaries, as well as to abandon their plans of
revitalizing Japanese imperialism and of converting Japan into
their springboard in the Far East.
“In this regard, I proceeded from the assumption that China
could not extract these concessions if it were to adopt a passive
wait-and-see policy, and that without serious struggle and an
imposing display force not only would China fail to obtain all
these concessions but it would not be able to get back even
Taiwan which at present the United States clings to as its
springboard not for Chiang Kai-shek, who has no chance to
succeed, but for themselves or for a militaristic Japan of
tomorrow.
“Of course, I took into account also (the possibility) that the
USA, despite its unreadiness for a big war, could still be drawn
into a big war out of (considerations of) prestige, which, in turn,
would drag China into the war, and along with this draw into the
war the USSR, which is bound with China by the Mutual
Assistance Pact. Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should
not, because together we will be stronger than the USA and
England, while the other European capitalist states (with the
exception of Germany which is unable to provide any assistance
to the United States now) do not present serious military forces.
If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few
years when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the
USA and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the
continued in a form of the entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee.
“Such were the considerations and prospects of an international
nature that I proceeded from when I was requesting a minimum
of five-six divisions from You.”
In response to this (letter), on October 7, I received letter from
Mao in which he expresses solidarity with the fundamental
positions discussed in my letter and declares that he will dispatch
to Korea nine, not six, divisions. But (he said) that he will send
them not now, but after some time. He also requested that I
receive his representatives and discuss some details of the
mission with them. Of course, I agreed to receive his
representatives and to discuss with them a detailed plan of
military assistance to Korea.
It is obvious from the above mentioned that You must stand firm
and fight for every tiny piece of your land, that You have to
strengthen resistance to the American occupiers of Korea and
prepare reserves, using for this purpose the military cadres of the
Korean People’s Army coming out from the encirclement. Also,
this shows that You are absolutely right in your proposal that we
transfer all Korean comrades studying in the USSR into the pilot
training program.
I will keep you informed about further talks with the Chinese
comrades. 8 October 1950.
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Notice how Stalin was willing to fight to the last Chinese, while
not committing Soviet forces. But as for Stalin’s observations on
the U.S., Japan and Taiwan, you could practically substitute 1950
with 2005 in terms of readiness and the will to tackle the issues
of today.
Hott Spotts will return on June 2.
Brian Trumbore
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