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09/01/2005
Israel's Strategy
Following are excerpts from a report titled “Two Roads
Diverged: Israel’s Post-Disengagement Strategic Options” put
out by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv
University.
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“For many years a large majority in Israel has understood the
difficult and painful choices facing the country. One choice is to
quit the territories and divide the region into two states that will
leave Israel with narrower borders, but whose limited size is
essential for ensuring that Israel remains a democratic state with
a solid Jewish majority. The other choice is continued Israeli
deployment in the Gaza Strip and West Bank in order to retain
control over all of the territory between the Mediterranean and
the Jordan River, even if this results in the loss of a Jewish
majority in the area within a short time and / or the end of Israel
as a democratic state.
“One person who understood the need for changing direction was
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who initiated the current political
plan that unilaterally cedes Israel’s control of the land and the
Arab population in the Gaza Strip. This plan arose in the
absence of a Palestinian partner with whom to negotiate a
program for ending Israel’s occupation and establishing a
Palestinian state alongside Israel .
“The evacuation of the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria will not
be echoed by similar withdrawals in the near future. It is
generally assumed that immediately after the withdrawal, Israel’s
government will falter and Knesset elections will be held, very
possibly before the scheduled date of November 2006. The
balance of forces in the inevitable political struggle will
undoubtedly be shaped by the deep rift and heated political and
public debate that has taken place this past year over the
disengagement .
“Underlying the short-range policy is the desire to avoid another
rupture in Israel’s weakened social fabric. The rationale is
predicated on the despair of reaching a political agreement with
the Palestinians, even though a window of opportunity seemed to
open after Arafat’s death. This policy will consciously avoid
taking further steps toward withdrawal Its main goals will be
the completion of the security fence, turning it into a separation
fence and de facto border, and at the same time ongoing
settlement expansion in most of the territory enclosed by the
fence.
“After Israel’s agonizing social and political confrontations of
the last year and after the trauma of the evacuation itself this
policy will strive to restore ‘domestic tranquility’ in the leading
government party and provide it with a strong opportunity to win
a new solid victory at the polls. If indeed this policy is adopted,
it will return Israel to the worldview and ideology that it
appeared to have shed in the last two years – a policy directed
toward a more vigorous settlement drive and strengthening
Jewish Israel through the unilateral determination of permanent
borders, on the assumption that they will eventually be accepted
by the Palestinians and the international community.
“Even if the security separation fence defines borders that
include a minimum Palestinian population in Israel (leaving
aside the question of approximately 200,000 Palestinians
residing in the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem), this will
not be sufficient to guarantee the plan’s success. The weak link
in this policy is the hopeful if not na ve assumption that the Arab
world will reconcile itself to it and accept the dictated borders for
the future Palestinian state although they neither match nor even
approximate the June 4, 1967 borders, with the possibility of
Palestinian territorial contiguity highly doubtful .
“The strategic goal of current Israeli policy appears to strive to
use the security fence for unilaterally determining the future
borders, since the fence will be transformed from a security
barrier into a political-demographic one .
“Three conclusions may be drawn from this scenario:
--Sooner or later this policy will lead to the renewal of a violent
struggle. Although the security fence will make it difficult for
suicide bombers to penetrate Israel, it will leave Israel exposed to
attack by high trajectory weapons.
--This policy will return Israel to the unstable international status
it had before the disengagement plan, with severe political,
economic, and moral implications .
--This policy will entail huge Israeli financial investments in new
settlement projects and their accompanying security features .
“The cornerstone of this policy is the realization that a permanent
arrangement will never be attained unless the two nations
separate, there is only minimal annexation of Arab-Palestinian
territory, and there is a proposal for realistic borders and
contiguous physical terrain that will permit the Palestinians to
establish a viable state of their own .
“Israel’s policy and international position will be examined
according to its record on the ground – either a continuation and
perhaps even acceleration of land acquisition and the physical
expansion of the existing settlements, or the reduction of the
settlements’ current perimeters while conveying an unequivocal
message that Israel is open to political suggestions .
“It is highly unlikely that pragmatic and capable leadership can
be found on either side that could facilitate an agreement today.
The weak political positions of Ariel Sharon and Abu Mazen
certainly preclude any chances of arriving at this goal in the near
future .
“The national election campaign that is expected in the coming
year will demand of the contending parties, with the government
party in the lead, to place the Palestinian issue at the forefront of
their political platforms. They will have to declare their
intentions of either settlement expansion or the opposite: steps
for further withdrawals .
“Finally, it is important to emphasize that in the coming years
Israel will have to decide on negotiations and the substance of
the political agreement it will eventually sign with the
Palestinians. At the same time, even if the long-range plans are
not directly connected with the imminent disengagement and its
results, the agreement will remain a limited, political one, and
Israel should not disillusion itself into thinking that a true
reconciliation with the Palestinians or the surrounding Arab
world can be attained in the foreseeable future .
“The public must be aware of the limitations of the political
goal .Similarly, we too must realize that even after an
agreement is reached with the Palestinians, the only factor
guaranteeing Israel’s survival in the coming years is its military
strength. In this strength lies the ability to deter the other side
from initiating military moves, and, if need be, to win decisively
while inflicting heavy losses and damage on the aggressor.
“If Israel decides not to sign an agreement with the Palestinians
(and Arab states) until absolute security has been achieved based
on the other side’s commitment to peace and reconciliation, then
Israel will have chosen the path of violent confrontation. On the
other hand, the realistic path for reaching genuine peace and
reconciliation lies in a long and gradual process. After the
political agreement is signed, after the strength of the agreement
removes all the centers of friction, and after an independent
Palestinian state is established, the Palestinian leadership will
have to bear the responsibility for administering the state. This
will require a change in its national priorities that will be possible
only when the reasons for violent armed conflict are removed.
“Last but not least, Israel’s problems in its narrow regional
sphere cannot be divorced from the formidable global problems
in the Arab-Muslim world where existential political, economic,
cultural, and even religious questions abound. The unrest and
struggle in the Arab world also impact on events in the local
arena.”
Hott Spotts returns next week with a few thoughts on the Iraqi
constitution.
Brian Trumbore
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