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08/18/2005
China's Military Power, Part I
Following are excerpts from the Defense Department’s annual
report to Congress titled “The Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China: 2005”.
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“Domestic protests, mainly directed at local policies and
officials, have grown violent over the past year, posing
increasing challenges to China’s internal security forces. The
number of these incidents in 2004 reached an all-time high of at
least 58,000, according to official Chinese estimates. The rising
number of protests reflects growing popular dissatisfaction with
official behavior related to property rights and forced relocations,
labor rights, pensions, corruption, and political reforms.”
“China became the world’s second largest consumer and third
largest importer of oil in 2003. As China’s energy and resource
needs grow, Beijing has concluded that access to these resources
requires special economic or foreign policy relationships in the
Middle East, Africa and Latin America, bringing China closer to
problem countries such as Iran, Sudan and Venezuela. Resource
concerns, among others, played a role in increased Sino-Japanese
tensions over the disputed East China Sea.”
“(China’s) 2004 Defense White Paper characterized the cross-
Strait situation as ‘grim,’ and elevated Taiwan and sovereignty
concerns to top priority for China’s armed forces – an
intensification of rhetoric from the previous Defense White
Paper (2002).”
“China used diplomatic pressures and verbal warnings to try
(unsuccessfully) to derail Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s re-
election in March 2004. Beijing sought to preempt Chen’s May
20 inaugural address by issuing a statement on May 17 warning
of the consequences of Taiwan’s ‘pursuit of a separatist
agenda.’”
“China continued to adhere to its policy of peaceful unification
under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework that offers
Taiwan limited autonomy in exchange for Taiwan’s integration
with the mainland.”
“China continued to deploy its most advanced systems to the
military regions directly opposite Taiwan. These new weapon
systems represent significant improvements from the older, less
capable hardware that remains the bulk of China’s inventory. To
realize the potential in the technologically advanced equipment,
China’s armed forces are attempting to integrate the systems into
the force structure, develop modern doctrine and tactics, and
improve training and exercises.”
“China has deployed 650-730 mobile short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs) to garrisons opposite Taiwan. Deployment of
these systems is increasing at a rate of about 100 missiles per
year. Newer versions of these missiles feature improved range
and accuracy.”
“China is modernizing its longer-range ballistic missile force by
replacing older systems with newer, more survivable missiles.
Over the next several years China will begin to bring into service
a new road-mobile, solid-propellant, intercontinental-range
ballistic missile (ICBM) and a new submarine-launched
ballistic missile.”
“China has 375,000 ground forces personnel deployed to the
three military regions opposite Taiwan. China has been
upgrading these units with amphibious armor and other vehicles,
such as tanks and armored personnel carriers.”
“China’s latest Defense White Paper deployed authoritatively a
new doctrinal term to describe future wars the PLA (People’s
Liberation Army) must be prepared to fight: ‘local wars under
conditions of informationalization.’ This term acknowledges the
PLA’s emphasis on information technology as a force multiplier
and reflects the PLA’s understanding of the implications of the
revolution in military affairs on the modern battlefield.”
“China is digesting lessons learned from coalition military
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. China can be expected to
incorporate these lessons into updated doctrine, planning, and
acquisition programs.”
“China is developing on the world stage as a regional power, but
its emergence also has global implications. China faces a
strategic crossroads. It can choose a pathway of peaceful
integration and benign competition. China can also choose, or
find itself upon, a pathway along which China would emerge to
exert dominant influence in an expanding sphere. Or, China
could emerge less confident and focused inward on challenges to
national unity and the Chinese Communist Party’s claim to
legitimacy. The future of a rising China is not yet set immutably
on one course or another.
“United States policy welcomes the rise of a peaceful and
prosperous China. However, there are forces – some beyond the
control of China’s military and national security planners – that
could divert China from a peaceful pathway. These include:
--nationalistic fervor bred by expanding economic power and
political influence;
--structural economic weaknesses and inefficiencies that could
undermine economic growth;
--an inability to accommodate the forces of an open, transparent
market economy;
--a government that is still adapting to great power roles; and,
--an expanding military-industrial complex that proliferates
advanced arms.”
“Continued strong economic performance, combined with rising
nationalism and confidence, could lead China to translate its
economic gains into fielding an increasingly capable military. It
could use its economic weight, backed by military power, to
attempt to dictate the terms of foreign security and economic
interactions with its trading partners and neighbors.
“Economic stagnation – which could aggravate domestic
political problems for Communist Party leaders – could lead
Beijing to reduce military spending, or alternatively, to shift
investments to the military in a bid to sustain domestic support
through nationalistic assertions abroad.
“An economic downturn might occur at some time in the future,
possibly as a result of the following factors: financial institutions
are vulnerable, the transition to a market economy is incomplete,
demographic change is placing stress on the social welfare
system, and poor environmental practices have set the conditions
for regional ecological disasters. A major economic downturn
could have broad effects across regional economies, produce
internal unrest, and generate refugee flows that could challenge
central government control.
“Party leaders have relaxed their grip on the economic sphere
and now allow greater public discourse on some issues, but
continue to repress any challenges to their monopoly on political
power. As documented in the latest U.S. Department of State
report on human rights, independent trade and labor unions are
suppressed, ethnic-Tibetan and Uighur minorities are repressed,
and religious groups continue to face harassment. Since 1999, as
many as 2,000 adherents of the spiritual movement Falun Gong
have died in prison from torture, abuse, or neglect. By
suppressing the sort of civil society that can provide stability in
crises, the Party has become less susceptible to small impacts but
remains vulnerable to larger perturbations.”
The “24 Character” Strategy
“In the early 1990s, former paramount Deng Xiaoping (d. 1997)
gave guidance to China’s foreign and security policy apparatus
that, collectively, has come to be known as the ’24 character’
strategy: ‘observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs
calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at
maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.’ Later,
the phrase, ‘make some contributions (you suo zuo wei)’ was
added.
“This strategy is often quoted by senior Chinese national security
officials, especially as it relates to China’s diplomacy. Although
certain aspects of this strategy have been debated in recent years
within China’s security establishment – namely the relative
emphasis placed upon ‘never claim leadership’ or ‘make some
contributions’ – taken as a whole, the strategy suggests both a
short-term desire to downplay China’s ambitions and a long-term
strategy to build up China’s power to maximize options for the
future.”
“Analysis of Chinese military acquisitions suggest the PLA is
generating military capabilities that go beyond a Taiwan
scenario. All of China’s SRBMs, although garrisoned opposite
Taiwan, are mobile and can deploy throughout the country to
take up firing positions in support of a variety of regional
contingencies. China is also developing new medium-range
systems that will improve its regional targeting capability. There
are corresponding improvements in intercontinental-range
missiles capable of striking targets across the globe, including in
the United States.”
“You fight your way and I fight my way.” --Mao Zedong
“Beijing’s definition of an attack against its territory, or what
constitutes an initial attack, is left vague In instances where
Beijing’s use of force involves core interests, such as Taiwan, it
could claim, as it has in the past, that preemptive uses of force
are strategically ‘defensive’ in nature, such as the 1979 ‘counter-
attack in self defense’ against Vietnam. Consequently, the term
‘active defense’ indicates little about when or how China would
initiate hostilities. Once Beijing determines that hostilities have
begun, evidence suggests the characteristics of ‘active defense’
are distinctly offensive. The PLA text, ‘The Study of
Campaigns,’ published in 2000, explains:
“While strategically the guideline is active defense, in military
campaigns, though, the emphasis is placed on taking the
initiative in active offense. Only in this way, the strategic
objective of active defense can be realized.”
“Over the past several decades, there has been a resurgence in
the study of ancient Chinese statecraft within the PLA. Whole
departments of military academies teach the precepts of
‘moulue,’ or strategic deception, derived from Chinese
experience through the millennia, particularly military aspects
surrounding the dynastic cycle. Modern China also has a track
record of successfully deceiving opponents. Through effective
use of deception from the strategic to the tactical levels, China’s
intervention in the Korean War caught the United States by
surprise. Similarly, India, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, as well
as many outside observers, did not anticipate Chinese incursions
into the territories of those countries.”
“China’s expanding international presence reflects a growing
interest in export markets and imports of key resources,
especially energy. As China’s economy grows, it will become
increasingly concerned with securing resource flows along key
lines of communication. For example, 80 percent of China’s oil
imports pass through the Strait of Malacca. In late 2003,
President Hu referred to China’s need to secure its lines of
communication as the ‘Malacca Dilemma.’
“With its present force structure, according to the Intelligence
Community, Chinese surface combatants would have difficulty
projecting power into the Strait of Malacca, especially if it were
conducting simultaneous blockade or invasion operations
elsewhere. Similarly, although the PLA Navy occasionally
patrols as far as the Spratly Islands, its limited organic air
defense capability leaves surface ships vulnerable to attack from
support system, and organization and planning is incompatible
with supply management. The first experimental joint logistics
unit was created only in July 2004.”
“China launched its first manned spacecraft into Earth orbit on
October 15, 2003. Chinese press reports indicate that it will send
up a two-person crew on a five-day mission in September 2005.”
“In 2004, China placed 10 satellites into orbit, the most of any
year, and has a similar schedule through 2006. It hopes to have
more than 100 satellites in orbit by 2010, and launch an
additional 100 satellites by 2020.”
More next week including a contrary opinion of the report.
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
Brian Trumbore
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