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08/25/2005
China's Military Power, Part II
More excerpts from the Defense Department’s annual report to
Congress titled “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of
China: 2005”.
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“The effort by the European Union in 2004 to lift its arms
embargo on China – in place since the 1989 Tiananmen Square
crackdown – followed intense lobbying by China to remove the
ban, which it refers to as a ‘relic of the Cold War.’ The
consequences of an EU arms embargo lift would be serious and
numerous. Although the EU stated that any lifting of the
embargo would produce no qualitative or quantitative increases
in China’s military capabilities, the EU’s tools to enforce such a
commitment remain inadequate. Lifting the embargo could
allow China access to military and dual-use technologies that
would help China to improve current weapon systems and to
improve indigenous industrial capabilities for production of
future advanced weapons systems. Ending the embargo could
also remove implicit limits on Chinese military interaction with
European militaries, giving China’s armed forces broad access to
critical military ‘software’ such as modern military management
practices, operational doctrine and training, and logistics
expertise.
“If the embargo is lifted, China’s strategy will likely center on
establishing joint ventures with EU companies as a means to
acquire access to expertise and technology.”
Taiwan
“The cross-Strait balance of power is shifting toward Beijing as a
result of China’s economic growth, growing diplomatic leverage,
and improvements in the PLA’s military capabilities, including
those that provide Beijing options short of full-scale invasion.
Chinese air, naval, and missile force modernization is increasing
demands on Taiwan to develop countermeasures that would
enable it to avoid being quickly overwhelmed.
“In contrast, Taiwan defense spending has steadily declined in
real terms over the past decade. Taiwan has traditionally
acquired capabilities, some asymmetric, to deter an attack by
making it too costly, while buying time for international
intervention. Taipei is continuing to acquire such capabilities,
but the growth of PLA capabilities is outpacing these
acquisitions.”
[The Bush administration is selling Taiwan $15.3 billion in air
defense systems, anti-submarine aircraft, and attack submarines;
though the sale is pending approval in Taiwan’s legislature.]
“Beijing views unification as a long-term goal. Its immediate
strategy is focused on deterring Taiwan from moving toward de
jure ‘independence.’ Beijing insists that Taipei accept the ‘one-
China’ principle, i.e., that there is but one China and Taiwan is
part of it, as a precondition to any cross-Strait dialogue.”
On March 14, 2005, China’s National People’s Congress passed
the “anti-secession law.” Among the key elements:
Article Four states that China’s reunification is the “sacred duty”
of “all Chinese people,” including “Taiwan compatriots.”
Article Eight states the State Council and China’s Military
Command “shall decide on and execute” non-peaceful means to
“protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” if
“secessionist forces cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from
China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur,
or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted.
Defense Department Assessment
“China’s current approach to preventing Taiwan independence
combines diplomatic, economic, legal, psychological, and
military instruments to convince Taipei that the price of
declaring independence is too high. This strategy combines the
credible threat to use military force with the economic and
cultural tools that China has at its disposal. China uses its
growing economic links with Taiwan to influence political
behavior on the island. Beijing seeks to attract more Taiwan
investment in China, while emphasizing that peace in the Strait
will bring prosperity. Beijing is increasing its pressure on
Taiwan businessmen operating in China to refrain from
supporting ‘pro-independence’ parties or individuals on Taiwan.
Beijing emphasizes historic, ethnic, and cultural links between
Taiwan and the mainland, and unofficial diplomacy with
‘Taiwan compatriots’ to generate domestic propaganda in
Taiwan in favor of reunification.
“Beijing has also intensified its competition with Taiwan in the
developing world for diplomatic recognition. This effort has
focused on eroding Taiwan’s diplomatic support among the 26
remaining countries that recognize Taipei.”
Nuclear Weapon / High-Altitude EMP Option
“Some PLA theorists are aware of the electromagnetic effects of
using a high-altitude nuclear burst to generate high-altitude
electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) and might consider using HEMP
as an unconventional attack, believing the United States and
other nations would not interpret it as a use of force and as
crossing the nuclear threshold. This capability would most likely
be used as part of a larger campaign to intimidate, if not
decapitate, the Taiwan leadership. HEMP causes a substantial
change in the ionization of the upper atmosphere, including the
ionosphere and magnetosphere. These effects likely would result
in the degradation of important war fighting capabilities, such as
key communication links, radar transmissions, and the full
spectrum of electro-optic sensors. Additional effects could
include severe disruptions to civil electric/power and
transportation. These effects cannot easily be localized to
Taiwan and would likely affect the mainland, Japan, the
Philippines, and commercial shipping and air routes in the
region.”
Third-Party Intervention
“Beijing sees Washington and, increasingly, Tokyo as the
principal hurdles to any attempt to use military force to coerce
or capture Taiwan. Beijing might coerce or target other critical
countries to deny or delay their willingness to provide support,
basing, overflight rights, or transit authority to U.S. forces
operating in the theater. Deterring, defeating, or delaying foreign
intervention ahead of Taiwan’s capitulation is integral to
Beijing’s strategy. To that end, Beijing will pursue political and
diplomatic efforts to keep the United States and Japan from
taking action to support Taiwan. The U.S. Intelligence
Community also believes China will consider a sea-denial
strategy to attempt to hold at risk U.S. naval forces, including
aircraft carriers and logistic forces, approaching the Taiwan
Strait.”
Factors of Deterrence
“China is deterred from taking military action against Taiwan on
two levels. It does not yet possess the military capability to
accomplish with confidence its political objectives on the island,
particularly when confronted with outside intervention. Beijing
is also deterred by the potential repercussions of any use of force
against Taiwan. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency,
China’s leaders recognize that a war could severely retard
economic development. Taiwan is China’s single largest source
of foreign direct investment. An extended campaign would
wreck Taiwan’s economic infrastructure, leading to high
reconstruction costs. International sanctions against Beijing,
either by individual states or by groups of states, could severely
damage Beijing’s economic development.
“Conflict with Taiwan could also lead to instability on the
mainland. Maintaining internal security in wartime appears to be
an important consideration in PLA planning – reflecting
leadership concerns about political stability. Failure would
almost certainly result in severe repercussions for those in the
leadership who had advocated such a course of action. A
conflict also would severely hurt the image China has sought to
project regionally and globally in recent years. If Beijing chose
to use force against Taiwan prior to the 2008 Olympics, China
would almost certainly face a boycott or loss of the games.
Finally, Beijing must calculate the probability of U.S.
intervention in any conflict in the Taiwan Strait. It views the
United States as having advantages over China in many scenarios
involving the use of military force. China’s leaders also
calculate a conflict over Taiwan involving the United States
would give rise to a long-term hostile relationship between the
two nations – a result that would not be in China’s interests.”
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Well, here is the take on the Pentagon’s report from Gary
Schmitt and Dan Blumenthal, experts on Asia and defense
policy, as noted in an op-ed for The Weekly Standard, Aug. 8,
2005.
“Months overdue, the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress on
China’s military power is a mix of happy talk, flabby strategic
musings, and sobering facts .
“(Publication) was delayed while its initial and more alarming
conclusions about China’s strategic intent were toned down.
Senior administration officials overruled the report’s authors,
professional analysts, and policy advisers at the Pentagon intent
on providing an unvarnished account of China’s military. And,
contrary to conventional Washington wisdom, this was done not
over the heads of the most senior ranks in the Pentagon but with
their agreement .
“What’s new in this year’s report is the finding that China’s
military buildup has begun to have serious implications not only
for the cross-strait balance of power but also for the region as a
whole .
“What’s not new in the report is China’s increasing military
capacity to bring Taiwan to its knees .the PLA leadership,
according to its own doctrinal papers, thinks a combination of
ballistic-missile, special-operation, and aerial strikes could be
sufficient to shock Taiwan’s population and leadership into
accepting Beijing’s version of ‘one China.’
“For similar reasons, China is working hard to develop the
capacity to blockade Taiwan
“Such scenarios, of course, raise the question of what role the
United States would or would not want to play in turning back
Chinese aggression. Here, too, the answer is clear as day:
China’s military knows that it must be able to prevent, or, at least
severely complicate, the American Navy’s use of its aircraft
carriers. To this end, as the new report spells out, China’s anti-
ship cruise missile force is growing by leaps and bounds. As
one PLA general remarked: ‘We have the ability to deal with an
aircraft carrier that dares to get into our range of fire.’
“Combine the PLA’s fascination with ‘carrier killing,’ its ability
to degrade severely the operational utility of U.S. air bases in
Japan through missile strikes, its aggressive pursuit of space and
counterspace capabilities, and its upgraded nuclear arsenal, and
you have a military that believes it has or is close to having the
means to make any American president think twice before going
to Taiwan’s rescue .
“But rather than face the facts presented in the report about the
character and scope of China’s military buildup, the tendency in
the senior ranks of the administration is to wash over them with
sound bites about our relationship with China being ‘good but
complex.’ Or worse .
“In reality, it is more accurate to say that the United States is at a
strategic crossroads when it comes to China. With our plate full
around the globe, we are understandably reluctant to raise
publicly the prospect of a new great power competition.
Nevertheless, the administration is doing quite a bit to contain
Chinese military power – our upgraded relations with Japan,
India, Vietnam, Singapore, and Australia are cases in point. But
our reluctance to admit this publicly to ourselves or to our allies,
and our rosy rhetoric about our ‘constructive’ relationship with
Beijing, leave us at a disadvantage as China ratchets up the
competition. As a practical matter, this attitude often leaves us a
day late and a dollar short when it comes to matching new
Chinese initiatives.
“Nor is our position sustainable. Beijing is not blind to our
reaching out to the powers in the region. For it, the competition
has already begun. The Pentagon’s report provide ample
evidence that this is the case, but then ducks the obvious
conclusion. Preparing the Congress and the public for that
competition should be a priority of the administration.
Unfortunately, this year’s report, for all its substantive merit,
fails the test.”
Hott Spotts will return Sept. 1.
Brian Trumbore
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