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01/26/2006

Back to China

I continue to catch up on some reading involving China.
Following are a few thoughts from Professor Robert S. Ross of
Boston College, the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian
Research at Harvard University and MIT. Prof. Ross wrote a
piece in the Fall 2005 edition of The National Interest titled
“Assessing the China Threat.”

---

[Excerpts]

“There is no question that countries that are vulnerable to
China’s improving ground force and land-based capabilities are
realigning toward China. South Korea understands that the
United States cannot offset Chinese ground force improvements,
given constraints on U.S. military power in mainland theaters,
and the ROK has readjusted accordingly. It no longer supports
U.S. policy toward North Korea, but rather cooperates with
China to undermine U.S. efforts to isolate and coerce North
Korea.”

[On Taiwan]

“Although the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan is stronger
today than at any time since the 1960s, the Taiwanese
independence movement is dying. Taiwanese polling
consistently reveals that less than 10 percent of the population
supports a declaration of independence. Eighty percent of the
people oppose changing the name of the island from “Republic
of China .[Opposition parties have exploited these sentiments
in making overtures to Beijing] Meanwhile, Taiwan resists
U.S. pressure to purchase advanced American weapons. Fifty-
five percent of the respondents in a recent poll believe that U.S.
weaponry cannot make Taiwan secure, and only 37 percent
support purchasing the weapons .

“China’s soft power has followed the rise of its hard power.
More than one million Taiwanese now have residences on the
mainland. By the end of 2004 there were more than 250,000
‘cross-strait marriages,’ and these marriages had grown to over
20 percent of all new Taiwanese marriages. In early 2004 there
were 5,000 students from Taiwan enrolled in Chinese
universities, even though Chinese degrees are not recognized by
Taiwan.”

[On other Southeast Asian nations]

“Singapore and the Philippines have been the most active in
cooperation with the U.S. military. In 2001 Singapore completed
construction of its Changi port facility, which is explicitly
designed to accommodate a U.S. aircraft carrier, and in March
2001 it hosted the first state visit of the USS Kitty Hawk. As
Singapore’s defense minister explained, ‘It is no secret that
Singapore believes that the presence of the U.S. military
contributes to the peace and stability of the region. To that
extent, we have facilitated the presence of U.S. military forces.’”

---

“The key issue in appraising the Chinese threat to U.S. security,
however, is not the ongoing growth of Chinese military and
economic power per se, but its effect on the U.S. presence in the
western Pacific and maritime Southeast Asia. Chinese military
and regional political advances to date reflect its improved
ground force and land-based capabilities. But the United States
keeps the peace and maintains the balance of power in East Asia
through its overwhelming naval presence. This is the source of
ongoing local alignment with the United States. For the rise of
China to pose a direct threat to U.S. security, China must possess
sufficient military capabilities to challenge the United States in
the western Pacific, including sufficient capability to risk war.
Alternatively, it must have at its disposal sufficient economic or
military power to undermine U.S. security guarantees for the
region’s maritime countries, compelling them to align with
China.”

---

“Nowhere is Chinese caution more evident than in the Taiwan
Strait. Despite the advances in Chinese capabilities, the
mainland has been exceedingly tolerant of Taiwan’s movement
toward sovereignty. Over the past five years Chen Shui-bian’s
rhetoric has amounted to an informal declaration of
independence. Much to the concern of both the Bush
Administration and Beijing, Chen has frequently suggested his
intention to replace the current constitution with a new
constitution that would establish de jure Taiwanese
independence. In response, China has fulminated, threatened,
deployed its forces and rattled its sabers, but it has refused to use
force, despite the leadership’s conviction that Chen is determined
to move Taiwan toward formal sovereignty and Chen’s apparent
disregard for Chinese resolve. Chinese leaders know that should
there be a war in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. Navy would
intervene and the cost to China would be intolerable. Only if
Taiwan actually declares de jure independence, thus challenging
the Communist Party’s domestic survival and leaving Beijing no
choice but to retaliate militarily, would China risk war with the
United States over Taiwan.

---

“So far, the United States has responded well to the rise of
China. It has maintained its deterrent and stabilized the regional
order. But the greatest challenge to the status quo and the
greatest contribution to the rise of China as a maritime power
may well be shortcomings in U.S. defense policy. Recent
attention to the Pentagon’s inability to acquire planned numbers
of next-generation aircraft carriers and fighter planes, and the
escalating costs of these programs, is disturbing. As Secretary
Rumsfeld observed, ‘Something’s wrong with the system.’ In
addition, deployment of U.S. forces in hostilities in peripheral
areas weakens our presence in East Asia.

“If the United States gives China the opportunity to displace the
U.S. presence, it will grab it. The United States should be under
no illusion that China will be content with the status quo should
its relative power increase. But if the United States does what it
can and should do – if it strengthens its regional military
presence and continues to modernize its forces – it can maintain
its maritime dominance, its deterrent capability, the regional
balance of power and U.S. security.”

---

From an article in the same issue of The National Interest by
Chung Min Lee, visiting professor at the National University of
Singapore.

[Excerpts]

“The leading Asian states find themselves in three strategic
quandaries produced by the rise of China. First, Asia’s relative
strategic weight in the global balance of power is once again
becoming equated with that of China’s own strategic disposition.
While China’s longer-term ascendance as the next superpower is
replete with significant hurdles, so long as Asia’s future paths
depend increasingly on China’s own trajectory, the blurring of
‘Asia’ and China will accelerate, which in turn is going to pose
progressively higher-threshold dilemmas for Asia and the
international system.

“Second, rarely (if ever) has the rise of a great power posed such
promises and hazards at the same time. The continuing rush to
join the Chinese economic bandwagon means that most of
China’s major trading partners have tended to downplay
sensitive political and military issues. While understandable in
the context of substantial economic incentives, it vitiates efforts
to counter-balance China’s strategic ambitions.

“Finally, the forging of viable coalitions to deny, delimit or even
contain China’s power projection capabilities and potentially
irredentist strategies has so far proven illusory. While pressures
can be mounted on China from various corners, no Asian country
today or in the foreseeable future is likely to contest China
directly at the cost of trade ties. As China moves in earnest to
build a blue-water navy, only two other regional navies – India’s
and Japan’s – would have the wherewithal to constrain China’s
maritime forays. None of the Asian powers, with the notable
exception of India, has indigenous nuclear forces to match
China’s – and whatever nuclear capacity India bears will be
constrained by its primary emphasis on deterring Pakistan.”

---

[China’s Asian neighbors can ill afford to ignore China’s 21st-
century strategic ambitions.]

“The major Asian states, therefore, have seemingly contradictory
goals in their policies toward China. They want to exploit the
benefits flowing from China’s rapid economic expansion while
ensuring that China’s increasingly robust diplomatic and military
forays are kept in check or even denied on a case-by-case basis.
This dilemma is perhaps most evident in the context of U.S.
strategy toward China. Some of America’s allies seem to have
chosen accommodation, while Japan and India appear to be
pursuing a policy that might be labeled ‘stealth constrainment,’
(sic) rather than overtly attempting to contain China’s enlarged
strategic footprints.”

[Conclusion]

“(If) China’s neighbors continue to brush aside, sidestep or even
deny the existence of enlarging Chinese footprints through
‘tactical accommodations,’ the longer-term cost will appear in
the form of narrowing security options and the real possibility of
a significantly retrenched U.S. presence in the region. The
message to the world is clear: While Europe’s core security
dilemmas are over, Asia’s are just beginning.”

---

Hott Spotts will return next week.

Brian Trumbore


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-01/26/2006-      
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Hot Spots

01/26/2006

Back to China

I continue to catch up on some reading involving China.
Following are a few thoughts from Professor Robert S. Ross of
Boston College, the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian
Research at Harvard University and MIT. Prof. Ross wrote a
piece in the Fall 2005 edition of The National Interest titled
“Assessing the China Threat.”

---

[Excerpts]

“There is no question that countries that are vulnerable to
China’s improving ground force and land-based capabilities are
realigning toward China. South Korea understands that the
United States cannot offset Chinese ground force improvements,
given constraints on U.S. military power in mainland theaters,
and the ROK has readjusted accordingly. It no longer supports
U.S. policy toward North Korea, but rather cooperates with
China to undermine U.S. efforts to isolate and coerce North
Korea.”

[On Taiwan]

“Although the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan is stronger
today than at any time since the 1960s, the Taiwanese
independence movement is dying. Taiwanese polling
consistently reveals that less than 10 percent of the population
supports a declaration of independence. Eighty percent of the
people oppose changing the name of the island from “Republic
of China .[Opposition parties have exploited these sentiments
in making overtures to Beijing] Meanwhile, Taiwan resists
U.S. pressure to purchase advanced American weapons. Fifty-
five percent of the respondents in a recent poll believe that U.S.
weaponry cannot make Taiwan secure, and only 37 percent
support purchasing the weapons .

“China’s soft power has followed the rise of its hard power.
More than one million Taiwanese now have residences on the
mainland. By the end of 2004 there were more than 250,000
‘cross-strait marriages,’ and these marriages had grown to over
20 percent of all new Taiwanese marriages. In early 2004 there
were 5,000 students from Taiwan enrolled in Chinese
universities, even though Chinese degrees are not recognized by
Taiwan.”

[On other Southeast Asian nations]

“Singapore and the Philippines have been the most active in
cooperation with the U.S. military. In 2001 Singapore completed
construction of its Changi port facility, which is explicitly
designed to accommodate a U.S. aircraft carrier, and in March
2001 it hosted the first state visit of the USS Kitty Hawk. As
Singapore’s defense minister explained, ‘It is no secret that
Singapore believes that the presence of the U.S. military
contributes to the peace and stability of the region. To that
extent, we have facilitated the presence of U.S. military forces.’”

---

“The key issue in appraising the Chinese threat to U.S. security,
however, is not the ongoing growth of Chinese military and
economic power per se, but its effect on the U.S. presence in the
western Pacific and maritime Southeast Asia. Chinese military
and regional political advances to date reflect its improved
ground force and land-based capabilities. But the United States
keeps the peace and maintains the balance of power in East Asia
through its overwhelming naval presence. This is the source of
ongoing local alignment with the United States. For the rise of
China to pose a direct threat to U.S. security, China must possess
sufficient military capabilities to challenge the United States in
the western Pacific, including sufficient capability to risk war.
Alternatively, it must have at its disposal sufficient economic or
military power to undermine U.S. security guarantees for the
region’s maritime countries, compelling them to align with
China.”

---

“Nowhere is Chinese caution more evident than in the Taiwan
Strait. Despite the advances in Chinese capabilities, the
mainland has been exceedingly tolerant of Taiwan’s movement
toward sovereignty. Over the past five years Chen Shui-bian’s
rhetoric has amounted to an informal declaration of
independence. Much to the concern of both the Bush
Administration and Beijing, Chen has frequently suggested his
intention to replace the current constitution with a new
constitution that would establish de jure Taiwanese
independence. In response, China has fulminated, threatened,
deployed its forces and rattled its sabers, but it has refused to use
force, despite the leadership’s conviction that Chen is determined
to move Taiwan toward formal sovereignty and Chen’s apparent
disregard for Chinese resolve. Chinese leaders know that should
there be a war in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. Navy would
intervene and the cost to China would be intolerable. Only if
Taiwan actually declares de jure independence, thus challenging
the Communist Party’s domestic survival and leaving Beijing no
choice but to retaliate militarily, would China risk war with the
United States over Taiwan.

---

“So far, the United States has responded well to the rise of
China. It has maintained its deterrent and stabilized the regional
order. But the greatest challenge to the status quo and the
greatest contribution to the rise of China as a maritime power
may well be shortcomings in U.S. defense policy. Recent
attention to the Pentagon’s inability to acquire planned numbers
of next-generation aircraft carriers and fighter planes, and the
escalating costs of these programs, is disturbing. As Secretary
Rumsfeld observed, ‘Something’s wrong with the system.’ In
addition, deployment of U.S. forces in hostilities in peripheral
areas weakens our presence in East Asia.

“If the United States gives China the opportunity to displace the
U.S. presence, it will grab it. The United States should be under
no illusion that China will be content with the status quo should
its relative power increase. But if the United States does what it
can and should do – if it strengthens its regional military
presence and continues to modernize its forces – it can maintain
its maritime dominance, its deterrent capability, the regional
balance of power and U.S. security.”

---

From an article in the same issue of The National Interest by
Chung Min Lee, visiting professor at the National University of
Singapore.

[Excerpts]

“The leading Asian states find themselves in three strategic
quandaries produced by the rise of China. First, Asia’s relative
strategic weight in the global balance of power is once again
becoming equated with that of China’s own strategic disposition.
While China’s longer-term ascendance as the next superpower is
replete with significant hurdles, so long as Asia’s future paths
depend increasingly on China’s own trajectory, the blurring of
‘Asia’ and China will accelerate, which in turn is going to pose
progressively higher-threshold dilemmas for Asia and the
international system.

“Second, rarely (if ever) has the rise of a great power posed such
promises and hazards at the same time. The continuing rush to
join the Chinese economic bandwagon means that most of
China’s major trading partners have tended to downplay
sensitive political and military issues. While understandable in
the context of substantial economic incentives, it vitiates efforts
to counter-balance China’s strategic ambitions.

“Finally, the forging of viable coalitions to deny, delimit or even
contain China’s power projection capabilities and potentially
irredentist strategies has so far proven illusory. While pressures
can be mounted on China from various corners, no Asian country
today or in the foreseeable future is likely to contest China
directly at the cost of trade ties. As China moves in earnest to
build a blue-water navy, only two other regional navies – India’s
and Japan’s – would have the wherewithal to constrain China’s
maritime forays. None of the Asian powers, with the notable
exception of India, has indigenous nuclear forces to match
China’s – and whatever nuclear capacity India bears will be
constrained by its primary emphasis on deterring Pakistan.”

---

[China’s Asian neighbors can ill afford to ignore China’s 21st-
century strategic ambitions.]

“The major Asian states, therefore, have seemingly contradictory
goals in their policies toward China. They want to exploit the
benefits flowing from China’s rapid economic expansion while
ensuring that China’s increasingly robust diplomatic and military
forays are kept in check or even denied on a case-by-case basis.
This dilemma is perhaps most evident in the context of U.S.
strategy toward China. Some of America’s allies seem to have
chosen accommodation, while Japan and India appear to be
pursuing a policy that might be labeled ‘stealth constrainment,’
(sic) rather than overtly attempting to contain China’s enlarged
strategic footprints.”

[Conclusion]

“(If) China’s neighbors continue to brush aside, sidestep or even
deny the existence of enlarging Chinese footprints through
‘tactical accommodations,’ the longer-term cost will appear in
the form of narrowing security options and the real possibility of
a significantly retrenched U.S. presence in the region. The
message to the world is clear: While Europe’s core security
dilemmas are over, Asia’s are just beginning.”

---

Hott Spotts will return next week.

Brian Trumbore