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04/13/2006

The NPT

In light of the important discussion in the U.S. Congress
concerning the recent U.S.-India nuclear pact that would allow
for the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to India, while
India’s nuclear weapons production facilities remain off limits to
inspectors, I thought we would review the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970.

From the United Nations’ web site:

“From the beginning of the nuclear age, and the use of nuclear
weapons it has been apparent that the development of nuclear
capabilities by States could enable them to divert technology and
materials for weapons purposes. Thus the problem of preventing
such diversions became a central issue in discussions on peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. Initial efforts, which began in 1946, to
create an international system enabling all States to have access
to nuclear technology under appropriate safeguards, were
terminated in 1949 without the achievement of this objective,
due to serious political differences between the major Powers.
By then, both the United States and the former Soviet Union had
tested nuclear weapons, and were beginning to build their
stockpiles.

In December 1953, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his
‘Atoms for Peace’ proposal (see below), presented to the UN
General Assembly, and urged that an international organization
be established to disseminate peaceful nuclear technology, while
guarding against development of weapons capabilities in
additional countries. His proposal resulted in 1957 in the
establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), which was charged with the dual responsibility of
promotion and control of nuclear technology .

“Within the framework of the United Nations, the principle of
nuclear non-proliferation was addressed in negotiations as early
as 1957 and gained significant momentum in the early 1960s.
The structure of a treaty to uphold nuclear non-proliferation as a
norm of international behavior had become clear by the mid-
1960s, and by 1968 final agreement had been reached on a
Treaty that would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
enable co-operation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and
further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament.”

[un.org]

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at a Glance

[From the Arms Control Association armscontrol.org]

The 189 signatories to the NPT (188 after North Korea withdrew
in 2003), are classified in two categories: nuclear-weapons states
(NWS) – consisting of the United States, Russia, China, France,
and the United Kingdom – and non-nuclear-weapon states
(NNWS). “Under the treaty, the five NWS commit to pursue
general and complete disarmament, while the NNWS agree to
forgo developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.”

“With its near-universal membership, the NPT has the widest
adherence of any arms control agreement, with only India, Israel,
and Pakistan remaining outside the treaty. In order to accede to
the treaty, these states must do so as NNWS, since the treaty
restricts NWS status to nations that ‘manufactured and exploded
a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to
January 1, 1967.’ For India, Israel, and Pakistan, all known to
possess or suspected of having nuclear weapons, joining the
treaty as NNWS would require that they dismantle their nuclear
weapons and place their nuclear materials under international
safeguards. South Africa followed this path to accession in
1991.”

Select Treaty Articles

“Under Articles I and II of the treaty, the NWS agree not to help
NNWS develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and the NNWS
permanently forswear the pursuit of such weapons. To verify
these commitments and ensure that nuclear materials are not
being diverted for weapons purposes, Article III tasks the
International Atomic Energy Agency with the inspection of the
non-nuclear weapon states’ nuclear facilities. In addition, Article
III establishes safeguards for the transfer of fissionable materials
between NWS and NNWS.

“Article IV acknowledges the ‘inalienable right’ of NNWS to
research, develop, and use nuclear energy for non-weapons
purposes. It also supports the ‘fullest possible exchange’ of such
nuclear-related information and technology between NWS and
NNWS. Article V, now effectively obsolete, permits NNWS
access to NWS research and development on the benefits of
nuclear explosions conducted for peaceful purposes. As the
perceived utility of peaceful nuclear explosions has diminished
over time, the relevance of this clause has lost much of its
practical value. It is now moot due to the restriction on all
nuclear explosions mandated by the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty – to which all five NWS are signatories.

“Article VI commits the NWS to ‘pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control.’ Acknowledging the necessity of
intermediate steps in the process of nuclear disarmament, Article
VII allows for the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-
free-zones.

“Article VIII requires a complex and lengthy process to amend
the treaty, effectively blocking any changes absent clear
consensus. Article X establishes the terms by which a state may
withdraw from the treaty, requiring three month’s advance notice
should ‘extraordinary events’ jeopardize its supreme national
interests.”

[The rest of the treaty is more on the administrative side.]

On January 10, 2003, North Korea announced it was
withdrawing from the NPT, effective the next day. Although
Article X requires that a country give three months notice in
advance of withdrawing, North Korea argued that it satisfied this
requirement because it originally announced its decision to
withdraw March 12, 1993, and suspended the decision one day
before it was to become legally binding.

[States that had nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs at
one time: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited nukes
following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but returned
them to Russia and joined the NPT as NNWS. South Africa
secretly developed and dismantled a small number of nuclear
warheads and also joined the NPT in 1991. Iraq had an active
nuclear weapons program prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War,
but was forced to verifiably dismantle it under the supervision of
UN inspectors. Libya voluntarily renounced its secret nuclear
weapons efforts in December 2003. Argentina, Brazil, South
Korea, and Taiwan also shelved nuclear weapons programs.]

The bottom line is the NPT covers non-proliferation,
disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.

But then there’s Iran, a signatory to the NPT which maintains it
is enriching uranium for its civilian nuclear energy program, as it
is entitled to do under the terms of the NPT. The United States
and the European Union say it’s just a cover for a nuclear
weapons program. IAEA inspectors are attempting to ascertain
where the truth lies and are to report back to the UN Security
Council in another few weeks.

---

[Following is President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s original address
to the UN General Assembly, “Atoms for Peace,” Dec. 8, 1953]

I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is
new, one which I, who have spent so much of my life in the
military profession, would have preferred never to use. That new
language is the language of atomic warfare.

The Atomic Age has moved forward at such a pace that every
citizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in
comparative terms, of the extent of this development, of the
utmost significance to every one of us. Clearly, if the peoples of
the world are to conduct an intelligent search for peace, they
must be armed with the significant facts of today’s existence.

My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in
United States terms, for these are the only incontrovertible facts
that I know. I need hardly point out to this Assembly, however,
that this subject is global, not merely national in character.

On July 16, 1945, the United States set off the world’s biggest
atomic explosion. Since that date in 1945, the United States of
America has conducted forty-two test explosions. Atomic bombs
are more than twenty-five times as powerful as the weapons with
which the Atomic Age dawned, while hydrogen weapons are in
the ranges of millions of tons of TNT equivalent.

Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of
course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the total
equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from
every plane and every gun in every theater of war in all the years
of World War II. A single air group, whether afloat or land
based, can now deliver to any reachable target a destructive
cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on Britain in all
World War II.

In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been
no less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic
weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our
armed services. In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the
Air Force, and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this
weapon to military use.

But the dread secret and the fearful engines of atomic might are
not ours alone. In the first place, the secret is possessed by our
friends and allies, the United Kingdom and Canada, whose
scientific genius made a tremendous contribution to our original
discoveries and the designs of atomic bombs. The secret is also
known by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has informed us
that, over recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to
atomic weapons. During this period the Soviet Union has
exploded a series of atomic devices, including at least one
involving thermonuclear reactions.

If at one time the United States possessed what might have been
called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to
exist several years ago. Therefore, although our earlier start has
permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative
advantage, the atomic realities of today comprehend two facts of
even greater significance. First, the knowledge now possessed
by several nations will eventually be shared by others, possibly
all others. Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of
weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation,
is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage
and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise
aggression.

The free world, at least dimly aware of these facts, has naturally
embarked on a large program of warning and defense systems.
That program will be accelerated and extended. But let no one
think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems
of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and
citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb
does not permit any such easy solution. Even against the most
powerful defense, an aggressor in possession of the effective
minimum number of atomic bombs for a surprise attack could
probably place a sufficient number of his bombs on the chosen
targets to cause hideous damage.

Should such an atomic attack be launched against the United
States, our reactions would be swift and resolute. But for me to
say that the defensive capabilities of the United States are such
that they could inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor, for me to
say that the retaliation capabilities of the United States are so
great that such an aggressor’s land would be laid waste, all this,
while fact, is not the true expression of the purpose and the hopes
of the United States.

To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a
belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye
each other indefinitely across a trembling world. To stop there
would be to accept helplessly the probability of civilization
destroyed, the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of
mankind handed down to us from generation to generation, and
the condemnation of mankind to begin all over again the age-old
struggle upward from savagery toward decency and right and
justice

Most recently we have received from the Soviet Union what is in
effect an expression of willingness to hold a four-power meeting.
Along with our allies, the United Kingdom and France, we were
pleased to see that this note did not contain the unacceptable
preconditions previously put forward The United States, the
United Kingdom, and France have agreed promptly to meet with
the Soviet Union.

The government of the United States approaches this conference
with hopeful sincerity. We will bend every effort of our minds to
the single purpose of emerging from that conference with
tangible results towards peace, the only true way of lessening
international tension.

We never have, and never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet
Union surrender what rightfully belongs to it. We will never say
that the peoples of the U.S.S.R. are an enemy with whom we
have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful
relationship. On the contrary, we hope that this coming
conference may initiate a relationship with the Soviet Union
which will eventually bring about a freer mingling of the peoples
of the East and of the West – the one sure, human way of
developing the understanding required for confident and peaceful
relations.

Instead of the discontent which is now settling upon Eastern
Germany, occupied Austria, and the countries of Eastern Europe,
we seek a harmonious family of free European nations, with
none a threat to the other, and least of all a threat to the peoples
of the U.S.S.R. Beyond the turmoil and strife and misery of
Asia, we seek peaceful opportunity for these peoples to develop
their natural resources and to elevate their lot.

These are not idle words or shallow visions. Behind them lies a
story of nations lately come to independence, not as a result of
war but through free grant or peaceful negotiation. There is a
record already written of assistance gladly given by nations of
the West to needy peoples and to those suffering the temporary
effects of famine, drought, and natural disaster. These are deeds
of peace. They speak more loudly than promises or protestations
of peaceful intent.

But I do not wish to rest either upon the reiteration of past
proposals or the restatement of past deeds. The gravity of the
time is such that every new avenue of peace, no matter how
dimly discernible, should be explored.

There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not been
well explored – an avenue now laid out by the General Assembly
of the United Nations. In its resolution of Nov. 28, 1953, this
General Assembly suggested:

“ that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of
establishing a subcommittee consisting of representatives of the
powers principally involved, which should seek in private an
acceptable solution and report on such a solution to the General
Assembly and to the Security Council not later than Sept. 1,
1954.”

The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet
privately with such other countries as may be “principally
involved,” to seek “an acceptable solution” to the atomic
armaments race which overshadows not only the peace but the
very life of the world.

We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks a new
conception. The United States would seek more than the mere
reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military
purposes. It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands
of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will
know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of
peace.

The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic
military build-up be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces
can be developed into a great boon for the benefit of all mankind.
The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic
energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already
proved, is here today. Who can doubt that, if the entire body of
the world’s scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of
fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas,
this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal,
efficient, and economic usage?

To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear
from the minds of the people and the governments of the East
and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now. I
therefore make the following proposals:

The governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by
elementary prudence, should begin now and continue to make
joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and
fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency.
We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the
aegis of the United Nations. The ratios of contributions, the
procedures and other details would properly be within the scope
of the “private conversations” I referred to earlier.

The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in
good faith. Any partner of the United States acting in the same
good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable or
ungenerous associate.

Undoubtedly, initial and early contributions to this plan would be
small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that
it can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions
incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system
of worldwide inspection and control.

The atomic energy agency could be made responsible for the
impounding, storage, and protection of the contributed
fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists
will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of
fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise
seizure.

The more important responsibility of this atomic energy agency
would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material
would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind.
Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs
of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special
purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the
power-starved areas of the world.

Thus the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their
strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.

The United States would be more than willing – it would be
proud – to take up with others “principally involved” the
development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic
energy would be expedited. Of those “principally involved” the
Soviet Union must, of course, be one.

I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United
States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan
that would, first, encourage worldwide investigation into the
most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with
the certainty that the investigators had all the material needed for
the conducting of all experiments that were appropriate; second,
begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world’s
atomic stockpiles; third, allow all peoples of all nations to see
that, in this enlightened age, the great powers of the earth, both
of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations
first rather than in building up the armaments of war; fourth,
open up a new channel for peaceful discussion and initiative, at
least, a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be
solved in both private and public conversations if the world is to
shake off the inertia imposed by fear and is to make positive
progress towards peace.

Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United
States does not wish merely to present strength but also the
desire and the hope for peace.

The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions. In
this Assembly, in the capitals and military headquarters of the
world, in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governed or
governors, may they be the decisions which will lead this world
out of fear and into peace.

To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States
pledges before you, and therefore before the world, its
determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma – to
devote its entire heart and mind to finding the way by which the
miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his
death, but consecrated to his life.

[The IAEA was founded in 1957.]

Source: United Nations – Official Records of the General
Assembly, Eighth Session, September 15-December 9, 1953.

---

Hott Spotts returns next week.

Brian Trumbore


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-04/13/2006-      
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Hot Spots

04/13/2006

The NPT

In light of the important discussion in the U.S. Congress
concerning the recent U.S.-India nuclear pact that would allow
for the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to India, while
India’s nuclear weapons production facilities remain off limits to
inspectors, I thought we would review the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970.

From the United Nations’ web site:

“From the beginning of the nuclear age, and the use of nuclear
weapons it has been apparent that the development of nuclear
capabilities by States could enable them to divert technology and
materials for weapons purposes. Thus the problem of preventing
such diversions became a central issue in discussions on peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. Initial efforts, which began in 1946, to
create an international system enabling all States to have access
to nuclear technology under appropriate safeguards, were
terminated in 1949 without the achievement of this objective,
due to serious political differences between the major Powers.
By then, both the United States and the former Soviet Union had
tested nuclear weapons, and were beginning to build their
stockpiles.

In December 1953, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his
‘Atoms for Peace’ proposal (see below), presented to the UN
General Assembly, and urged that an international organization
be established to disseminate peaceful nuclear technology, while
guarding against development of weapons capabilities in
additional countries. His proposal resulted in 1957 in the
establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), which was charged with the dual responsibility of
promotion and control of nuclear technology .

“Within the framework of the United Nations, the principle of
nuclear non-proliferation was addressed in negotiations as early
as 1957 and gained significant momentum in the early 1960s.
The structure of a treaty to uphold nuclear non-proliferation as a
norm of international behavior had become clear by the mid-
1960s, and by 1968 final agreement had been reached on a
Treaty that would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
enable co-operation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and
further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament.”

[un.org]

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at a Glance

[From the Arms Control Association armscontrol.org]

The 189 signatories to the NPT (188 after North Korea withdrew
in 2003), are classified in two categories: nuclear-weapons states
(NWS) – consisting of the United States, Russia, China, France,
and the United Kingdom – and non-nuclear-weapon states
(NNWS). “Under the treaty, the five NWS commit to pursue
general and complete disarmament, while the NNWS agree to
forgo developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.”

“With its near-universal membership, the NPT has the widest
adherence of any arms control agreement, with only India, Israel,
and Pakistan remaining outside the treaty. In order to accede to
the treaty, these states must do so as NNWS, since the treaty
restricts NWS status to nations that ‘manufactured and exploded
a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to
January 1, 1967.’ For India, Israel, and Pakistan, all known to
possess or suspected of having nuclear weapons, joining the
treaty as NNWS would require that they dismantle their nuclear
weapons and place their nuclear materials under international
safeguards. South Africa followed this path to accession in
1991.”

Select Treaty Articles

“Under Articles I and II of the treaty, the NWS agree not to help
NNWS develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and the NNWS
permanently forswear the pursuit of such weapons. To verify
these commitments and ensure that nuclear materials are not
being diverted for weapons purposes, Article III tasks the
International Atomic Energy Agency with the inspection of the
non-nuclear weapon states’ nuclear facilities. In addition, Article
III establishes safeguards for the transfer of fissionable materials
between NWS and NNWS.

“Article IV acknowledges the ‘inalienable right’ of NNWS to
research, develop, and use nuclear energy for non-weapons
purposes. It also supports the ‘fullest possible exchange’ of such
nuclear-related information and technology between NWS and
NNWS. Article V, now effectively obsolete, permits NNWS
access to NWS research and development on the benefits of
nuclear explosions conducted for peaceful purposes. As the
perceived utility of peaceful nuclear explosions has diminished
over time, the relevance of this clause has lost much of its
practical value. It is now moot due to the restriction on all
nuclear explosions mandated by the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty – to which all five NWS are signatories.

“Article VI commits the NWS to ‘pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control.’ Acknowledging the necessity of
intermediate steps in the process of nuclear disarmament, Article
VII allows for the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-
free-zones.

“Article VIII requires a complex and lengthy process to amend
the treaty, effectively blocking any changes absent clear
consensus. Article X establishes the terms by which a state may
withdraw from the treaty, requiring three month’s advance notice
should ‘extraordinary events’ jeopardize its supreme national
interests.”

[The rest of the treaty is more on the administrative side.]

On January 10, 2003, North Korea announced it was
withdrawing from the NPT, effective the next day. Although
Article X requires that a country give three months notice in
advance of withdrawing, North Korea argued that it satisfied this
requirement because it originally announced its decision to
withdraw March 12, 1993, and suspended the decision one day
before it was to become legally binding.

[States that had nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs at
one time: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited nukes
following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but returned
them to Russia and joined the NPT as NNWS. South Africa
secretly developed and dismantled a small number of nuclear
warheads and also joined the NPT in 1991. Iraq had an active
nuclear weapons program prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War,
but was forced to verifiably dismantle it under the supervision of
UN inspectors. Libya voluntarily renounced its secret nuclear
weapons efforts in December 2003. Argentina, Brazil, South
Korea, and Taiwan also shelved nuclear weapons programs.]

The bottom line is the NPT covers non-proliferation,
disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.

But then there’s Iran, a signatory to the NPT which maintains it
is enriching uranium for its civilian nuclear energy program, as it
is entitled to do under the terms of the NPT. The United States
and the European Union say it’s just a cover for a nuclear
weapons program. IAEA inspectors are attempting to ascertain
where the truth lies and are to report back to the UN Security
Council in another few weeks.

---

[Following is President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s original address
to the UN General Assembly, “Atoms for Peace,” Dec. 8, 1953]

I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is
new, one which I, who have spent so much of my life in the
military profession, would have preferred never to use. That new
language is the language of atomic warfare.

The Atomic Age has moved forward at such a pace that every
citizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in
comparative terms, of the extent of this development, of the
utmost significance to every one of us. Clearly, if the peoples of
the world are to conduct an intelligent search for peace, they
must be armed with the significant facts of today’s existence.

My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in
United States terms, for these are the only incontrovertible facts
that I know. I need hardly point out to this Assembly, however,
that this subject is global, not merely national in character.

On July 16, 1945, the United States set off the world’s biggest
atomic explosion. Since that date in 1945, the United States of
America has conducted forty-two test explosions. Atomic bombs
are more than twenty-five times as powerful as the weapons with
which the Atomic Age dawned, while hydrogen weapons are in
the ranges of millions of tons of TNT equivalent.

Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of
course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the total
equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from
every plane and every gun in every theater of war in all the years
of World War II. A single air group, whether afloat or land
based, can now deliver to any reachable target a destructive
cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on Britain in all
World War II.

In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been
no less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic
weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our
armed services. In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the
Air Force, and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this
weapon to military use.

But the dread secret and the fearful engines of atomic might are
not ours alone. In the first place, the secret is possessed by our
friends and allies, the United Kingdom and Canada, whose
scientific genius made a tremendous contribution to our original
discoveries and the designs of atomic bombs. The secret is also
known by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has informed us
that, over recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to
atomic weapons. During this period the Soviet Union has
exploded a series of atomic devices, including at least one
involving thermonuclear reactions.

If at one time the United States possessed what might have been
called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to
exist several years ago. Therefore, although our earlier start has
permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative
advantage, the atomic realities of today comprehend two facts of
even greater significance. First, the knowledge now possessed
by several nations will eventually be shared by others, possibly
all others. Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of
weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation,
is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage
and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise
aggression.

The free world, at least dimly aware of these facts, has naturally
embarked on a large program of warning and defense systems.
That program will be accelerated and extended. But let no one
think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems
of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and
citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb
does not permit any such easy solution. Even against the most
powerful defense, an aggressor in possession of the effective
minimum number of atomic bombs for a surprise attack could
probably place a sufficient number of his bombs on the chosen
targets to cause hideous damage.

Should such an atomic attack be launched against the United
States, our reactions would be swift and resolute. But for me to
say that the defensive capabilities of the United States are such
that they could inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor, for me to
say that the retaliation capabilities of the United States are so
great that such an aggressor’s land would be laid waste, all this,
while fact, is not the true expression of the purpose and the hopes
of the United States.

To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a
belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye
each other indefinitely across a trembling world. To stop there
would be to accept helplessly the probability of civilization
destroyed, the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of
mankind handed down to us from generation to generation, and
the condemnation of mankind to begin all over again the age-old
struggle upward from savagery toward decency and right and
justice

Most recently we have received from the Soviet Union what is in
effect an expression of willingness to hold a four-power meeting.
Along with our allies, the United Kingdom and France, we were
pleased to see that this note did not contain the unacceptable
preconditions previously put forward The United States, the
United Kingdom, and France have agreed promptly to meet with
the Soviet Union.

The government of the United States approaches this conference
with hopeful sincerity. We will bend every effort of our minds to
the single purpose of emerging from that conference with
tangible results towards peace, the only true way of lessening
international tension.

We never have, and never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet
Union surrender what rightfully belongs to it. We will never say
that the peoples of the U.S.S.R. are an enemy with whom we
have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful
relationship. On the contrary, we hope that this coming
conference may initiate a relationship with the Soviet Union
which will eventually bring about a freer mingling of the peoples
of the East and of the West – the one sure, human way of
developing the understanding required for confident and peaceful
relations.

Instead of the discontent which is now settling upon Eastern
Germany, occupied Austria, and the countries of Eastern Europe,
we seek a harmonious family of free European nations, with
none a threat to the other, and least of all a threat to the peoples
of the U.S.S.R. Beyond the turmoil and strife and misery of
Asia, we seek peaceful opportunity for these peoples to develop
their natural resources and to elevate their lot.

These are not idle words or shallow visions. Behind them lies a
story of nations lately come to independence, not as a result of
war but through free grant or peaceful negotiation. There is a
record already written of assistance gladly given by nations of
the West to needy peoples and to those suffering the temporary
effects of famine, drought, and natural disaster. These are deeds
of peace. They speak more loudly than promises or protestations
of peaceful intent.

But I do not wish to rest either upon the reiteration of past
proposals or the restatement of past deeds. The gravity of the
time is such that every new avenue of peace, no matter how
dimly discernible, should be explored.

There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not been
well explored – an avenue now laid out by the General Assembly
of the United Nations. In its resolution of Nov. 28, 1953, this
General Assembly suggested:

“ that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of
establishing a subcommittee consisting of representatives of the
powers principally involved, which should seek in private an
acceptable solution and report on such a solution to the General
Assembly and to the Security Council not later than Sept. 1,
1954.”

The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet
privately with such other countries as may be “principally
involved,” to seek “an acceptable solution” to the atomic
armaments race which overshadows not only the peace but the
very life of the world.

We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks a new
conception. The United States would seek more than the mere
reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military
purposes. It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands
of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will
know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of
peace.

The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic
military build-up be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces
can be developed into a great boon for the benefit of all mankind.
The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic
energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already
proved, is here today. Who can doubt that, if the entire body of
the world’s scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of
fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas,
this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal,
efficient, and economic usage?

To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear
from the minds of the people and the governments of the East
and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now. I
therefore make the following proposals:

The governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by
elementary prudence, should begin now and continue to make
joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and
fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency.
We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the
aegis of the United Nations. The ratios of contributions, the
procedures and other details would properly be within the scope
of the “private conversations” I referred to earlier.

The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in
good faith. Any partner of the United States acting in the same
good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable or
ungenerous associate.

Undoubtedly, initial and early contributions to this plan would be
small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that
it can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions
incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system
of worldwide inspection and control.

The atomic energy agency could be made responsible for the
impounding, storage, and protection of the contributed
fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists
will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of
fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise
seizure.

The more important responsibility of this atomic energy agency
would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material
would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind.
Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs
of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special
purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the
power-starved areas of the world.

Thus the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their
strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.

The United States would be more than willing – it would be
proud – to take up with others “principally involved” the
development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic
energy would be expedited. Of those “principally involved” the
Soviet Union must, of course, be one.

I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United
States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan
that would, first, encourage worldwide investigation into the
most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with
the certainty that the investigators had all the material needed for
the conducting of all experiments that were appropriate; second,
begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world’s
atomic stockpiles; third, allow all peoples of all nations to see
that, in this enlightened age, the great powers of the earth, both
of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations
first rather than in building up the armaments of war; fourth,
open up a new channel for peaceful discussion and initiative, at
least, a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be
solved in both private and public conversations if the world is to
shake off the inertia imposed by fear and is to make positive
progress towards peace.

Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United
States does not wish merely to present strength but also the
desire and the hope for peace.

The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions. In
this Assembly, in the capitals and military headquarters of the
world, in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governed or
governors, may they be the decisions which will lead this world
out of fear and into peace.

To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States
pledges before you, and therefore before the world, its
determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma – to
devote its entire heart and mind to finding the way by which the
miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his
death, but consecrated to his life.

[The IAEA was founded in 1957.]

Source: United Nations – Official Records of the General
Assembly, Eighth Session, September 15-December 9, 1953.

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Hott Spotts returns next week.

Brian Trumbore