04/20/2006
Iran...Differing Views
Following are various thoughts on how to handle Iran from the Spring 2006 edition of The National Interest. I will continue to offer my own sentiments in my “Week in Review” column.
Former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft:
“To deter Tehran, it is essential that there be a united front between the United States, the European Union, Russia and China to prevent Iran from exploiting any differences or finding any sort of wiggle room that would allow it to continue with its program.
“The issue, of course, is that under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran – as well as any other signatory of the NPT – is entitled to a fuel cycle as part of its right to peacefully utilize nuclear energy for civilian use. The problem is that the process and equipment for enriching uranium and reprocessing spent fuel for peaceful purposes is identical to that for producing weapons- grade material.
“What we need to do, therefore, is find a mechanism that will allow all NPT countries to enjoy all of the benefits of a civilian nuclear energy program while preventing the production of weapons-grade nuclear material under close supervision.
“The permanent five members of the Security Council [U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia] should be prepared to make the following offer to Iran. Acknowledging that Tehran has every right to exploit nuclear energy for civilian use, Iran should be guaranteed an adequate supply of nuclear fuel for its reactors (under a use-and-return system such as that proposed by Russia) in return for abiding by all IAEA regulations. This, in turn, should serve as the basis for a new international fuel-cycle regime that applies to all countries. Any approach to stemming nuclear proliferation that singles out specific countries – such as the Bush Administration is doing with Iran – is not likely to succeed.”
[Scowcroft is against the U.S.-India nuclear deal because in assessing the character of regimes and governments, the U.S. opens up divisions among the world’s nuclear powers, “with each making a list of ‘friends’ who can be trusted with nuclear technology and ‘foes’ who are dangerous risks.]
“Iran’s strategy remains predicated on the assumption that no ‘united front’ is possible, that even if the United States, the European Union, Russia and China all agree that a nuclear- capable Iran is undesirable, disagreement over tactics will preclude any effective action. The Bush Administration needs to be prepared to find common ground with the other permanent members of the Security Council. This includes being prepared to talk to the Iranians and to put the question of security guarantees on the table. Indeed, something that might develop as a result of this process would be a move toward giving all non- nuclear states firm security guarantees about safeguarding their independence and territorial integrity as a way to further provide incentives for current non-nuclear states not to pursue a nuclear program .
“(We) also need to recognize that, in the case of Iran, we need to be prepared to strike deals with the other major powers to take their interests into account. In particular, China is caught between its stated desire not to see Iran become a nuclear weapons state and its growing energy dependence on Iran. The United States and other countries should be prepared to guarantee to China that if, as a result of pressure placed on Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program, oil and gas supplies to China are affected, all efforts will be undertaken to minimize the disruption to the Chinese economy, and at a minimum that China would suffer no more than anyone else .We should never take the stance that ‘virtue is its own reward’ when dealing with a serious issue like nuclear non-proliferation.”
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Ray Takeyh, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations:
“After 27 years, the complexion of the Iranian regime is changing. An ascetic ‘war generation’ is assuming power with a determination to rekindle revolutionary fires long extinguished.
“For (Iranian President Mahmoud) Ahmadinejad and his allies, the 1980-88 war with Iraq defined their experiences, and it conditions their political assumptions. The Iran-Iraq War was unusual in many respects, as it was not merely an interstate conflict designed to achieve specific territorial or even political objectives. This was a war waged for the triumph of ideas, with Ba’athi secular pan-Arabism contesting Iran’s Islamic fundamentalism. As such, for those who went to the front, the war came to embody their revolutionary identity. Themes of solidarity, sacrifice, self-reliance and commitment not only allowed the regime to consolidate its power, they also made the defeat of Saddam the ultimate test of theocratic legitimacy .
“(But while) many Iranians wanted to forget the war (after Ayatollah Khomeini suddenly declared it to be over), for people like Ahmadinejad the war, its struggles and its lessons are far from being a faded memory: They are constantly invoked. In his much-discussed speech in front of the UN General Assembly in September, Iran’s new president used the platform offered to him to pointedly admonish the gathering heads of state for their shortcomings:
‘For eight years, Saddam’s regime imposed a massive war of aggression against my people. It employed the most heinous weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, against Iranians and Iraqis alike. Who, in fact, armed Saddam with those weapons? What was the reaction of those who claim to fight against WMDs regarding the use of chemical weapons then?’
“A pronounced suspicion of the United States and the international community would come to characterize Ahmadinejad’s perspective. After all, neither America’s human rights commitments nor the many treaties prohibiting the use of weapons of mass destruction saved Iran’s civilians and combatants from Saddam’s wrath. The lesson that the veterans drew from the war was that Iran’s independence and territorial integrity could only be safeguarded by its own initiatives and not by international legal compacts and Western benevolence .
“(So) while much of Iran had moved on in the 1990s, the austere veterans nursed their grievances and, more ominously, assumed important positions in the security services and the Revolutionary Guards. The move to political office was natural, even inevitable.
“ ‘We must return to the roots of the revolution,’ proclaimed Ahmadinejad during his many campaign stops.”
[But instead of empty campaign promises and slogans, there was something different about Ahmadinejad. He really meant what he said, as Takeyh wrote, that the problems could be resolved if Iran went back to its revolutionary roots.]
Iran had grown soft, Ahmadinejad felt, but for “Iran to be revitalized and reawakened, its leaders had to capture the moral cohesion and the stern discipline of those who bravely confronted Saddam’s war machine. The instrument of Iran’s redemption had to be Islam – not the passive, indifferent, establishment Islam, but the revolutionary, politicized and uncompromising devotion that launched the initial Islamic Republic under the leadership of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini.”
Takeyh writes of the perceptions of America.
“For the aging mullahs such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the more pragmatic head of the Expediency Council, Hashemi Rafsanjani, America remained the dominant actor in Iran’s melodrama. For the hardliners, the United States was the source of all of Iran’s problems, while for the older generation of more pragmatist conservatives it was the solution to the theocracy’s mounting dilemmas. In either depiction, America was central to Iran’s affairs .
“In terms of their international perspective, Ahmadinejad’s generation of conservatives does not share its elders’ preoccupation with America. Their insularity and their ideology- laden assumptions about America as a pernicious, imperial power lessen their enthusiasm for coming to terms with a country long depicted as the ‘Great Satan.’”
For the younger hardliners, power is flowing eastward. The head of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, speaks of Russia, China and India as playing “a balancing role in today’s world,” while the mayor of Tehran, Muhammad Qalibaf, declared, “In the current international arena we see the emergence of South Asia. And if we do not take advantage of that, we will lose.”
The war generation is indifferent to the United States. Ahmadinejad said “Our nation is continuing (its) path of progress and on this path has no significant need for the United States.”
Then there is Israel. Ahmadinejad:
“Anybody who takes a step toward Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nations’ fury.”
Ray Takeyh:
“In essence, Iran’s president was suggesting that the Islamic Republic, on behalf of the entire Islamic community, would no longer be prepared to accept a peace treaty that was endorsed by the Palestinian officials and the Arab states. Indeed, Iran would not just continue its assistance to radical Palestinian groups determined to scuttle any peace treaty, but would potentially renew its earlier policy of seeking to subvert Arab regimes that normalized ties with the Jewish state.”
Takeyh’s conclusion:
“As Iran plots its nuclear strategy, the American demands that it relinquish its fuel-cycle rights granted to it by the NPT have aroused an intense nationalistic uproar. Larijani emphasized this point, stressing, ‘Access to nuclear technology is our right and [we] will insist on it.’ As a country that has historically been the subject of foreign intervention and the imposition of various capitulation treaties, Iran is inordinately sensitive of its national prerogatives and sovereign rights. The new rulers of Iran believe they are being challenged not because of their provocations and previous treaty violations, but because of superpower bullying. In a peculiar manner, the nuclear program and Iran’s national identity have become fused in the imagination of the hardliners. To stand against an impudent America is to validate one’s revolutionary ardor and sense of nationalism. Thus, the notion of compromise and acquiescence has limited utility to Iran’s aggrieved nationalists.
“It is still too early to suggest that Iran is re-entering the dark ages of the early revolutionary period. The Islamic Republic is a government ruled by factions and competing power centers. The intriguing aspect of Iran that tends to persistently puzzle Western observers is that these political factions never completely lose their influence despite poor electoral performance. The fact remains that they all represent important constituencies and have a presence in the complicated web of informal and formal institutions that govern the Islamic Republic .
“However, it is undeniable that a new, harsh political tendency led by a severe war generation has infiltrated the corridors of power. Ahmadinejad and his allied faction (with their powerful appeals to Khomeini’s legacy and open contempt for their elders’ corruption) cannot be discounted or dismissed. Although it may be difficult for a Western audience to appreciate, Ahmadinejad’s message of economic populism and nationalistic self-assertion does enjoy a level of public support, particularly among the lower classes struggling with Iran’s inequalities. A strident new voice has now enshrined itself within the landscape of the Islamic Republic, pressing Iran toward confrontation abroad and reaction at home.”
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W. Patrick Laing, former head of Middle East Intelligence at the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Larry C. Johnson, formerly of the CIA and State Department:
“Contemplating the Ifs”
“In (an) atmosphere of building tension, Iran is not going to sit idly by and wait for America to crush it. Tehran has nearly achieved the installation of a friendly government on its western border. While U.S. Bases in Iraq could potentially be used to infiltrate Iran with spies and commandos and, more importantly, to support and launch air strikes, those bases are vulnerable politically, not to mention logistically. The supply lines of food, water, fuel and bullets to U.S. bases run from Kuwait to the north and through the Iraqi Shi’a heartland. Iranian intelligence agencies have given Iraqi Shi’a massive support since the U.S. invasion. The Shi’a are well organized and control the country through which U.S. supplies are moved. Islamic militants loyal to the likes of Ali al-Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr could easily cut vital supply lines.
“Iran can also play the oil card. If Iran were attacked, Iran could halt its oil exports and thereby immediately impact the global price. It would be unwise to hope that Iran, as part of its national security plan, is not willing to shut down Persian Gulf oil exports. Iran is well equipped to shower Persian Gulf states and oil fields with missiles, or to shut down exports with a variety of other military, terrorist or political methods. At a minimum, a U.S. military air campaign, even if successful in wrecking the Iranian nuclear program, would severely disrupt oil markets for at least six months .In addition, there are countries sympathetic to Iran, such as Venezuela, that have indicated they are more than willing to cut off their oil supply to the United States. The U.S. could find itself facing a 20-30 percent shortfall in oil imports (and that estimate assumes that the Saudi fields are untouched and that oil imports continue to flow unimpeded).
“Finally, Iran can play the global terror card. Unlike Al-Qaeda, groups tied directly to Iran continue to have robust capabilities and could cause a lot of trouble over the short term. Hizbullah in particular has a significant presence in South America. U.S. commercial and transportation assets there would certainly be targeted, further inflicting damage to the U.S. economy .
“(And) what would the Chinese do? They hold a substantial amount of U.S. debt. What happens if they decide to find some other currency to hold instead of the dollar? This could add an entirely new and dangerous dimension to an attack on Iran. Put simply, the United States spends too much and saves too little, and Asia saves too much and spends too little. The Chinese would view a disruption in the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf as a damaging blow to the U.S. economy. Although the dollar traditionally has been the currency people seek during a crisis, the growing imbalance with China creates new dynamics that could convince the Chinese that holding dollars no longer made economic sense. Under such a scenario, dumping dollars on the international market would trigger an inflationary spiral in the United States .
“The point for U.S. planners and policymakers, though, is to recognize that war brings unintended consequences that go well beyond the tactical realities on the ground where the fighting occurs. At a minimum, we should contemplate how a pre- emptive military strike in Iran could harm other U.S. foreign policy interests. A crisis in Iran would not occur in a vacuum .
“What would be the posture of the United States if the Iranians gain nuclear weapons? Would we maintain forces in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq? How safe would Europe feel, given the ranges of ballistic missiles Iran is developing, plus those that the Chinese have previously sold to Middle Eastern countries (Saudi Arabia, for example)? In the end, it may become necessary to confront Iran militarily over its emergent nuclear power status, but the costs would be so high that all diplomatic resources should be exhausted before such measures are adopted.”
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I am headed overseas for a spell ending up in the Far East. Hott Spotts will return on May 11. In the meantime, peruse the archives!
Brian Trumbore
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