03/08/2007
Dealing With Iran
Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of “Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic,” has received a fair amount of publicity for his views, recently, and he has an important essay in the March/April edition of Foreign Affairs titled “Time for D tente with Iran.” Following are a few of his thoughts.
“Only five years after the Bush administration vowed to transform the Middle East, the region is indeed profoundly different. Washington’s misadventures in Iraq, the humbling of Israeli power in Lebanon, the rise of the once-marginalized Shiites, and the ascendance of Islamist parties have pushed the Middle East to the brink of chaos.”
And through it all, Iran has managed to enhance its influence in the region. Takeyh writes it’s also hard to imagine any of the problems being resolved without Iran’s cooperation, and its nuclear program contributes to its power.
Since the revolution, “the United States has pursued a series of incoherent policies toward Tehran. At various points, it has tried to topple the regime – even, on occasion, threatening military action. At others, it has sought to hold talks on a limited set of issues. Throughout, it has worked to box in Iran and to limit its influence in the region. But none of these approaches has worked, especially not containment, which is still the strategy of choice in the Iran policy debate.”
Takeyh says President George W. Bush is foolish to constantly say “all options are on the table” – a not-so-subtle reminder that the U.S. could use force – when it overlooks the fact Washington is in no shape to act militarily against Iran. Tehran’s nuclear facilities are dispersed around the country, deep underground, and our intelligence hasn’t been the best in recent years to begin with. To destroy a few sites would only motivate them to rebuild and further ignore any treaty obligations.
But in the past, both containment and sanctions haven’t worked. Iran continues to support terrorism and it has advanced on the nuclear front.
“Nor is any other country in the Middle East likely to stand up to Iran today. A long tradition of purchasing security from the British Empire and then from the United States historically offered the Arab sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf a degree of independence vis- -vis their powerful Persian neighbor. But the Bush administration’s impetuous behavior and its inability to pacify Iraq have shattered local confidence in U.S. capabilities. Widespread anti-Americanism has made it harder for governments in the region to cooperate with Washington or to allow U.S. forces on their soil. The United States may be able to keep offshore naval forces and modest bases in reliable states such as Kuwait, but it is unlikely to have a significant presence in the region, as it is too unpopular with the masses and seems too erratic to the elites. Many Persian Gulf states now have more confidence in Iran’s motivations than in the United States’ destabilizing designs. And so as Iran’s power increases, the local sheikdoms are likely to opt for accommodating Tehran rather than confronting it.”
Takeyh says the United States “must accept some distasteful facts – such as Iran’s ascendance as a regional power and the endurance of its regime – and then ask how these can be accommodated. Despite its incendiary rhetoric and flamboyant claims, the Islamic Republic is not Nazi Germany. It is an opportunistic power seeking to assert predominance in its immediate neighborhood without recourse to war.”
In dealing with Iran, Washington thus needs to adopt a policy of d tente. We’ve done it before. China was a belligerent bully in the 1960s, but President Richard Nixon and national security adviser Henry Kissinger “did not respond by denying the reality of Chinese power.” They started talking and it helped stabilize East Asia. Similarly, d tente with the Soviet Union worked in gaining cooperation on arms control issues. [Ed. Though some Reaganites would say it only prolonged the misery of the people of Eastern Europe, which I’m not sure is a fair analysis considering items such as a near nuclear war over the Arab- Israeli conflict in those days.]
Even Iran’s new leaders such as President Ahmadinejad have “refrained from denouncing and plotting the overthrow of the monarchies of the Persian Gulf and the pro-Western regimes in Egypt and Jordan; they are more concerned with these states’ external relations than with their internal composition.”
With regards to Iraq, Takeyh says Tehran continues “to support Shiite parties not because they wish to install an Iranian puppet or proxy there but because they hope to prevent the rise of another hostile Sunni-dominated regime.”
As for Ahmadinejad, specifically, Takeyh observes:
“Despite his religious convictions, (he) is not a messianist seeking to usher in a new world order; he is a canny manipulator trying to rouse public indignation in a chaotic neighborhood. He understands that the carnage in Iraq, the stalled Israeli- Palestinian peace process, and the inability of Arab rulers to stand up to Washington have created intense anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East and that there is growing popular hunger for a leader willing to stand up to Israel and the United States. And he very much wants to be that leader.”
Nuclear weapons help Ahmadinejad eclipse U.S. influence in the region – “a prize worth suffering pain and sanctions to achieve.”
Meanwhile, the head of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, represents the other side of the ‘new right’ in Iran. Larijani said in late 2005, “We may be sure that the Americans are our enemies, (but) working with the enemy is part of the work of politics.” Then he added, “The strategy of curbing and reducing disruptions and normalizing relations is itself beneficial in the long term.” In the view of hawks like Larijani, smoothing over relations with the United States will only lead to more influence for Iran.
But the man at the very top of things in Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, is known to be indecisive, which is working to the advantage of the pragmatists, such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, thus far. Iran’s political landscape, however, “is changing rapidly. The United States’ declining fortunes in Iraq, Hizbullah’s touted victory against Israel last summer, and the success of Ahmadinejad’s defiant nuclear diplomacy seem to prove right those who call for confrontation.” [Takeyh]
Accordingly, Takeyh writes that if the hands of the pragmatists are to be strengthened, Iran needs to be offered relief from sanctions and diplomatic relations. “Washington’s recognition of Iran’s regional status and deepened economic ties with the West might finally enable the pragmatists to push Khamenei to marginalize the radicals who insist that only confrontation with the United States can allow Iran to achieve its national objectives.”
Takeyh recommends the United States pursue four tracks.
1) Set a timetable for resuming diplomatic relations.
2) The nuclear program. “The notion that the Islamic Republic will follow the Libyan model and completely dismantle its nuclear infrastructure is not tenable.” Iran needs to submit to a rigorous inspection regime, but it should be granted the right to develop a limited capability to enrich uranium; though in turn accept snap inspections and a permanent presence from the International Atomic Energy Agency.
3) Focus on Iraq. “The Iranian ruling elite also appreciates that the most suitable way to realize its aims is through elections, which are bound to further empower the majority Shiite community. A functioning Iraqi state would facilitate the departure of U.S. forces, neutralize the insurgency, and incorporate moderate Sunnis into the governing order – all goals that serve the interests of both Iran and the United States.”
4) “And thorniest” – focus on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, “which Tehran has steadfastly opposed, often by supporting terrorism.”
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I’ll continue to utilize my “Week in Review” column for my own thoughts on the above.
Hott Spotts returns next week.
Brian Trumbore
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