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03/08/2007

Dealing With Iran

Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
and author of “Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic
Republic,” has received a fair amount of publicity for his views,
recently, and he has an important essay in the March/April
edition of Foreign Affairs titled “Time for D tente with Iran.”
Following are a few of his thoughts.

“Only five years after the Bush administration vowed to
transform the Middle East, the region is indeed profoundly
different. Washington’s misadventures in Iraq, the humbling of
Israeli power in Lebanon, the rise of the once-marginalized
Shiites, and the ascendance of Islamist parties have pushed the
Middle East to the brink of chaos.”

And through it all, Iran has managed to enhance its influence in
the region. Takeyh writes it’s also hard to imagine any of the
problems being resolved without Iran’s cooperation, and its
nuclear program contributes to its power.

Since the revolution, “the United States has pursued a series of
incoherent policies toward Tehran. At various points, it has tried
to topple the regime – even, on occasion, threatening military
action. At others, it has sought to hold talks on a limited set of
issues. Throughout, it has worked to box in Iran and to limit its
influence in the region. But none of these approaches has
worked, especially not containment, which is still the strategy of
choice in the Iran policy debate.”

Takeyh says President George W. Bush is foolish to constantly
say “all options are on the table” – a not-so-subtle reminder that
the U.S. could use force – when it overlooks the fact Washington
is in no shape to act militarily against Iran. Tehran’s nuclear
facilities are dispersed around the country, deep underground,
and our intelligence hasn’t been the best in recent years to begin
with. To destroy a few sites would only motivate them to rebuild
and further ignore any treaty obligations.

But in the past, both containment and sanctions haven’t worked.
Iran continues to support terrorism and it has advanced on the
nuclear front.

“Nor is any other country in the Middle East likely to stand up to
Iran today. A long tradition of purchasing security from the
British Empire and then from the United States historically
offered the Arab sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf a degree of
independence vis- -vis their powerful Persian neighbor. But the
Bush administration’s impetuous behavior and its inability to
pacify Iraq have shattered local confidence in U.S. capabilities.
Widespread anti-Americanism has made it harder for
governments in the region to cooperate with Washington or to
allow U.S. forces on their soil. The United States may be able to
keep offshore naval forces and modest bases in reliable states
such as Kuwait, but it is unlikely to have a significant presence in
the region, as it is too unpopular with the masses and seems too
erratic to the elites. Many Persian Gulf states now have more
confidence in Iran’s motivations than in the United States’
destabilizing designs. And so as Iran’s power increases, the local
sheikdoms are likely to opt for accommodating Tehran rather
than confronting it.”

Takeyh says the United States “must accept some distasteful
facts – such as Iran’s ascendance as a regional power and the
endurance of its regime – and then ask how these can be
accommodated. Despite its incendiary rhetoric and flamboyant
claims, the Islamic Republic is not Nazi Germany. It is an
opportunistic power seeking to assert predominance in its
immediate neighborhood without recourse to war.”

In dealing with Iran, Washington thus needs to adopt a policy of
d tente. We’ve done it before. China was a belligerent bully in
the 1960s, but President Richard Nixon and national security
adviser Henry Kissinger “did not respond by denying the reality
of Chinese power.” They started talking and it helped stabilize
East Asia. Similarly, d tente with the Soviet Union worked in
gaining cooperation on arms control issues. [Ed. Though some
Reaganites would say it only prolonged the misery of the people
of Eastern Europe, which I’m not sure is a fair analysis
considering items such as a near nuclear war over the Arab-
Israeli conflict in those days.]

Even Iran’s new leaders such as President Ahmadinejad have
“refrained from denouncing and plotting the overthrow of the
monarchies of the Persian Gulf and the pro-Western regimes in
Egypt and Jordan; they are more concerned with these states’
external relations than with their internal composition.”

With regards to Iraq, Takeyh says Tehran continues “to support
Shiite parties not because they wish to install an Iranian puppet
or proxy there but because they hope to prevent the rise of
another hostile Sunni-dominated regime.”

As for Ahmadinejad, specifically, Takeyh observes:

“Despite his religious convictions, (he) is not a messianist
seeking to usher in a new world order; he is a canny manipulator
trying to rouse public indignation in a chaotic neighborhood. He
understands that the carnage in Iraq, the stalled Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, and the inability of Arab rulers to
stand up to Washington have created intense anti-Americanism
throughout the Middle East and that there is growing popular
hunger for a leader willing to stand up to Israel and the United
States. And he very much wants to be that leader.”

Nuclear weapons help Ahmadinejad eclipse U.S. influence in the
region – “a prize worth suffering pain and sanctions to achieve.”

Meanwhile, the head of the Supreme National Security Council,
Ali Larijani, represents the other side of the ‘new right’ in Iran.
Larijani said in late 2005, “We may be sure that the Americans
are our enemies, (but) working with the enemy is part of the
work of politics.” Then he added, “The strategy of curbing and
reducing disruptions and normalizing relations is itself beneficial
in the long term.” In the view of hawks like Larijani, smoothing
over relations with the United States will only lead to more
influence for Iran.

But the man at the very top of things in Iran, Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei, is known to be indecisive, which is
working to the advantage of the pragmatists, such as Hashemi
Rafsanjani, thus far. Iran’s political landscape, however, “is
changing rapidly. The United States’ declining fortunes in Iraq,
Hizbullah’s touted victory against Israel last summer, and the
success of Ahmadinejad’s defiant nuclear diplomacy seem to
prove right those who call for confrontation.” [Takeyh]

Accordingly, Takeyh writes that if the hands of the pragmatists
are to be strengthened, Iran needs to be offered relief from
sanctions and diplomatic relations. “Washington’s recognition
of Iran’s regional status and deepened economic ties with the
West might finally enable the pragmatists to push Khamenei to
marginalize the radicals who insist that only confrontation with
the United States can allow Iran to achieve its national
objectives.”

Takeyh recommends the United States pursue four tracks.

1) Set a timetable for resuming diplomatic relations.

2) The nuclear program. “The notion that the Islamic Republic
will follow the Libyan model and completely dismantle its
nuclear infrastructure is not tenable.” Iran needs to submit to a
rigorous inspection regime, but it should be granted the right to
develop a limited capability to enrich uranium; though in turn
accept snap inspections and a permanent presence from the
International Atomic Energy Agency.

3) Focus on Iraq. “The Iranian ruling elite also appreciates that
the most suitable way to realize its aims is through elections,
which are bound to further empower the majority Shiite
community. A functioning Iraqi state would facilitate the
departure of U.S. forces, neutralize the insurgency, and
incorporate moderate Sunnis into the governing order – all goals
that serve the interests of both Iran and the United States.”

4) “And thorniest” – focus on the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process, “which Tehran has steadfastly opposed, often by
supporting terrorism.”

---

I’ll continue to utilize my “Week in Review” column for my own
thoughts on the above.

Hott Spotts returns next week.

Brian Trumbore


AddThis Feed Button

 

-03/08/2007-      
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Hot Spots

03/08/2007

Dealing With Iran

Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
and author of “Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic
Republic,” has received a fair amount of publicity for his views,
recently, and he has an important essay in the March/April
edition of Foreign Affairs titled “Time for D tente with Iran.”
Following are a few of his thoughts.

“Only five years after the Bush administration vowed to
transform the Middle East, the region is indeed profoundly
different. Washington’s misadventures in Iraq, the humbling of
Israeli power in Lebanon, the rise of the once-marginalized
Shiites, and the ascendance of Islamist parties have pushed the
Middle East to the brink of chaos.”

And through it all, Iran has managed to enhance its influence in
the region. Takeyh writes it’s also hard to imagine any of the
problems being resolved without Iran’s cooperation, and its
nuclear program contributes to its power.

Since the revolution, “the United States has pursued a series of
incoherent policies toward Tehran. At various points, it has tried
to topple the regime – even, on occasion, threatening military
action. At others, it has sought to hold talks on a limited set of
issues. Throughout, it has worked to box in Iran and to limit its
influence in the region. But none of these approaches has
worked, especially not containment, which is still the strategy of
choice in the Iran policy debate.”

Takeyh says President George W. Bush is foolish to constantly
say “all options are on the table” – a not-so-subtle reminder that
the U.S. could use force – when it overlooks the fact Washington
is in no shape to act militarily against Iran. Tehran’s nuclear
facilities are dispersed around the country, deep underground,
and our intelligence hasn’t been the best in recent years to begin
with. To destroy a few sites would only motivate them to rebuild
and further ignore any treaty obligations.

But in the past, both containment and sanctions haven’t worked.
Iran continues to support terrorism and it has advanced on the
nuclear front.

“Nor is any other country in the Middle East likely to stand up to
Iran today. A long tradition of purchasing security from the
British Empire and then from the United States historically
offered the Arab sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf a degree of
independence vis- -vis their powerful Persian neighbor. But the
Bush administration’s impetuous behavior and its inability to
pacify Iraq have shattered local confidence in U.S. capabilities.
Widespread anti-Americanism has made it harder for
governments in the region to cooperate with Washington or to
allow U.S. forces on their soil. The United States may be able to
keep offshore naval forces and modest bases in reliable states
such as Kuwait, but it is unlikely to have a significant presence in
the region, as it is too unpopular with the masses and seems too
erratic to the elites. Many Persian Gulf states now have more
confidence in Iran’s motivations than in the United States’
destabilizing designs. And so as Iran’s power increases, the local
sheikdoms are likely to opt for accommodating Tehran rather
than confronting it.”

Takeyh says the United States “must accept some distasteful
facts – such as Iran’s ascendance as a regional power and the
endurance of its regime – and then ask how these can be
accommodated. Despite its incendiary rhetoric and flamboyant
claims, the Islamic Republic is not Nazi Germany. It is an
opportunistic power seeking to assert predominance in its
immediate neighborhood without recourse to war.”

In dealing with Iran, Washington thus needs to adopt a policy of
d tente. We’ve done it before. China was a belligerent bully in
the 1960s, but President Richard Nixon and national security
adviser Henry Kissinger “did not respond by denying the reality
of Chinese power.” They started talking and it helped stabilize
East Asia. Similarly, d tente with the Soviet Union worked in
gaining cooperation on arms control issues. [Ed. Though some
Reaganites would say it only prolonged the misery of the people
of Eastern Europe, which I’m not sure is a fair analysis
considering items such as a near nuclear war over the Arab-
Israeli conflict in those days.]

Even Iran’s new leaders such as President Ahmadinejad have
“refrained from denouncing and plotting the overthrow of the
monarchies of the Persian Gulf and the pro-Western regimes in
Egypt and Jordan; they are more concerned with these states’
external relations than with their internal composition.”

With regards to Iraq, Takeyh says Tehran continues “to support
Shiite parties not because they wish to install an Iranian puppet
or proxy there but because they hope to prevent the rise of
another hostile Sunni-dominated regime.”

As for Ahmadinejad, specifically, Takeyh observes:

“Despite his religious convictions, (he) is not a messianist
seeking to usher in a new world order; he is a canny manipulator
trying to rouse public indignation in a chaotic neighborhood. He
understands that the carnage in Iraq, the stalled Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, and the inability of Arab rulers to
stand up to Washington have created intense anti-Americanism
throughout the Middle East and that there is growing popular
hunger for a leader willing to stand up to Israel and the United
States. And he very much wants to be that leader.”

Nuclear weapons help Ahmadinejad eclipse U.S. influence in the
region – “a prize worth suffering pain and sanctions to achieve.”

Meanwhile, the head of the Supreme National Security Council,
Ali Larijani, represents the other side of the ‘new right’ in Iran.
Larijani said in late 2005, “We may be sure that the Americans
are our enemies, (but) working with the enemy is part of the
work of politics.” Then he added, “The strategy of curbing and
reducing disruptions and normalizing relations is itself beneficial
in the long term.” In the view of hawks like Larijani, smoothing
over relations with the United States will only lead to more
influence for Iran.

But the man at the very top of things in Iran, Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei, is known to be indecisive, which is
working to the advantage of the pragmatists, such as Hashemi
Rafsanjani, thus far. Iran’s political landscape, however, “is
changing rapidly. The United States’ declining fortunes in Iraq,
Hizbullah’s touted victory against Israel last summer, and the
success of Ahmadinejad’s defiant nuclear diplomacy seem to
prove right those who call for confrontation.” [Takeyh]

Accordingly, Takeyh writes that if the hands of the pragmatists
are to be strengthened, Iran needs to be offered relief from
sanctions and diplomatic relations. “Washington’s recognition
of Iran’s regional status and deepened economic ties with the
West might finally enable the pragmatists to push Khamenei to
marginalize the radicals who insist that only confrontation with
the United States can allow Iran to achieve its national
objectives.”

Takeyh recommends the United States pursue four tracks.

1) Set a timetable for resuming diplomatic relations.

2) The nuclear program. “The notion that the Islamic Republic
will follow the Libyan model and completely dismantle its
nuclear infrastructure is not tenable.” Iran needs to submit to a
rigorous inspection regime, but it should be granted the right to
develop a limited capability to enrich uranium; though in turn
accept snap inspections and a permanent presence from the
International Atomic Energy Agency.

3) Focus on Iraq. “The Iranian ruling elite also appreciates that
the most suitable way to realize its aims is through elections,
which are bound to further empower the majority Shiite
community. A functioning Iraqi state would facilitate the
departure of U.S. forces, neutralize the insurgency, and
incorporate moderate Sunnis into the governing order – all goals
that serve the interests of both Iran and the United States.”

4) “And thorniest” – focus on the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process, “which Tehran has steadfastly opposed, often by
supporting terrorism.”

---

I’ll continue to utilize my “Week in Review” column for my own
thoughts on the above.

Hott Spotts returns next week.

Brian Trumbore