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Wall Street History
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08/19/2005
Walesa and Solidarity, Part II
Continuing with our story of Lech Walesa and the Solidarity labor movement in Poland, recall that on August 30, 1980, the Polish government authorized the Gdansk Agreement which accepted “the formation of free trade unions as a genuine representation of the working class,” including the right to strike. Meanwhile, the Kremlin saw this as the greatest potential threat to the Soviet Bloc since the Prague Spring. KGB Director Yuri Andropov was demanding a crackdown.
On December 5, 1980, the Warsaw Pact leaders met in Moscow to discuss the crisis. Polish leader Stanislaw Kania, who had succeeded Edward Gierek in September, was told that unless he moved against Solidarity and the Catholic Church, Warsaw Pact forces would intervene. Eighteen divisions were already on the border and Kania was shown plans for the occupation of Poland’s cities and towns. Kania, in a private meeting with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, told him that military intervention would be a disaster for the Soviet Union as well as Poland. Brezhnev replied, “OK, we don’t march into Poland now, but if the situation gets any worse we will come.” [Source: “The Sword and the Shield,” Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin ..hereafter ‘S&S’]
As it turns out this was a bluff, as Soviet forces were already at war in Afghanistan while everyone knew an invasion of Poland would be a bloodbath resulting in Western economic sanctions. Brezhnev and Andropov sought to pressure Poland into declaring martial law to end Solidarity’s challenge to the one-party state.
Enter General Wojciech Jaruzelski. On February 9, 1981, the former defense minister became prime minister of Poland. “Jaruzelski was an enigmatic figure for most Poles. But he had a relatively favorable public image due both to the fact that he had refused to use troops against the workers in 1970 and to the reputation of the armed forces as a most trusted state institution.” [S&S]
But on March 4, the Kremlin summoned both Jaruzelski and Communist party leader Kania, demanding to know when Poland would declare martial law. But Kania didn’t give in, later telling a member of the Polish Politburo, “In spite of the pressure from Moscow, I don’t want to use force against the opposition. I don’t want to go down in history as the butcher of the Polish people.” [S&S]
Brezhnev addressed the Soviet Politburo on April 2.
“We have huge worries about the outcome of events in Poland. Worst of all is that our friends listen and agree with our recommendations, but in practice they don’t do anything. And a counter-revolution is taking the offensive on all fronts!”
The defense minister, Dmitri Ustinov, said if Socialism was to survive in Poland, “bloodshed is unavoidable.” “Solidarity,” reported Andropov, “is now starting to grab one position after the other” and went on:
“We have to tell them that martial law means a curfew, limited movement in the city streets, strengthening state security [the SB] in Party institutions, factories, etc. The pressure from the leaders of Solidarity has left Jaruzelski in terribly bad shape, while lately Kania has begun to drink more and more. [Ed. note: Kania had quite a reputation in this regard.] This is a very sad phenomenon.” [S&S]
On May 13, Pope John Paul II was shot in St. Peter’s Square. In the weeks after, Warsaw Pact commander-in-chief Marshal Kulikov accused Jaruzelski of being a coward. But by October, Kania himself was expressing doubts about the whole Soviet system, as told to a close supporter.
“The Soviet system of Socialism had failed the test. The fact that the USSR was systematically buying grain in the West was an indication of serious errors of the management of agriculture The power of the Soviet regime was maintained only through the army and other agencies of coercion.”
Kania went on to talk of strengthening ties between the United States and China as well as the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan.
“If at the present time the USSR still had some strategic advantage over the USA, within three or four years it would lose it, as the Soviet economy would no longer be able to meet the additional expense of developing and producing new types of armaments.”
By late November, 1981, Brezhnev stepped up his berating of Jaruzelski and the general began to crack under the pressure. He told the Polish Politburo on December 5 that there appeared to be no alternative to declaring martial law. A plan was drawn up to isolate Solidarity leaders and “extremists.” On December 8-9, Jaruzelski briefed Marshal Kulikov on the timetable. 80,000 personnel had been selected to arrest 6,000 Solidarity activists in a few days in what was dubbed “Operation X.”
On Saturday, December 12, Jaruzelski received permission from the Kremlin for Operation X to commence that evening. Foreign reporters without permanent accreditation would be expelled. The arrests would begin at midnight. 4,200 would be detained overnight and another 4,500 placed in “protective custody” on Sunday. Lech Walesa was told he would be arrested unless he entered talks with the government. At 6:00 AM, Jaruzelski declared martial law and announced the creation of a “Military Council for National Salvation.” The security forces had orders to open fire if they encountered serious resistance.
For its part Solidarity had begun to believe all the talk about the weakness of the Polish government and thus they were surprised by the show of force. Poles awoke that Sunday morning to find army checkpoints all over the place and declarations of martial law posted to every street corner.
“Jaruzelski’s 6:00 AM broadcast was repeated throughout the day, interspersed with Chopin polonaises and patriotic music. Television viewers saw Jaruzelski, dressed in army uniform, sitting at a desk in front of a large Polish flag. ‘Citizens and lady citizens of the Polish People’s Republic!’ he began. ‘I speak to you as a soldier and head of government! Our motherland is on the verge of an abyss!’ Many interpreted his speech as a warning that only martial law could save Poland from a Soviet invasion.” [S&S]
Walesa was taken away by military escort and placed in a government villa where he would remain for eleven months. Archbishop Cardinal Josef Glemp’s homily that Sunday was closely followed by authorities. Walesa and others would be disappointed.
“Opposition to the decisions of the authorities under martial law could cause violent reprisals, including bloodshed There is nothing of greater value than human life.”
Historian Timothy Garton Ash wrote of Glemp’s performance, “The Primate’s words were bitterly resented by many Christian Poles who were, at that moment, preparing to risk their own lives for what they considered greater values.”
Jaruzelski was relieved and Glemp’s words were repeatedly broadcast on television. Violence was minimal, save for a sit-in by 2,000 miners where seven were killed when security forces moved in to break it up. Everyone seemed mindful of the threat of Soviet intervention.
Back to Walesa, he had become a worldwide celebrity and it was impossible for Poland’s security service to subject him to the brutality reserved for others over the years. He refused to negotiate and when urged to give up his resistance by Glemp’s representative replied, “They’ll come to me on their knees!”
But on November 11, 1982, the anniversary of Polish independence, and a day after the death of Leonid Brezhnev, Lech Walesa was freed. Jaruzelski told enraged Soviet officials that Walesa no longer had his Solidarity base but by January 1983, Walesa was back at his job in the Gdansk shipyards. A few months later when he was spotted at a football game, 40,000 began shouting “Walesa!” and “Long live Solidarity!” Then a nine-day visit by Pope John Paul in June further helped in putting Walesa back into the international spotlight.
As for Solidarity, it was still outlawed and the Pope could not meet with its leaders, except on the final day when Walesa was granted an audience. A month later the government lifted martial law.
But when Deputy Prime Minister Rakowski visited the shipyards to address workers on the third anniversary of the August 1980 accords, he was upstaged by Walesa and Solidarity hecklers. It was an embarrassing moment and the government decided to broadcast a totally concocted video of Walesa, purportedly showing examples of his corrupt ways.
“The dialogue was constructed by splicing together some of Walesa’s public statements, misleading extracts from the stolen tape-recording of his birthday celebrations and words spoken by a Warsaw actor imitating Walesa’s voice.”
The dialogue included this fabricated exchange between Walesa and his brother concerning his supposed fortune in the West.
Lech Walesa: You know all in all it is over a million dollars Somebody has to draw it all and put it somewhere. It can’t be brought into the country, though.
Stanislaw Walesa: No, no, no!
Lech: So I thought about it and they came here and this priest had an idea that they would open an account in that bank, the papal one. They give 15 percent there Somebody has to arrange it all, open accounts in the Vatican. I can’t touch it though or I’d get smashed in the mug. So you could
State security was trying to sabotage Walesa’s bid for the Nobel Peace Prize. Continuing with the fake dialogue:
Lech Walesa: I’d get it if it weren’t for the Church! But the Church is starting to interfere.
Stanislaw Walesa: Yeah, because they’ve put up the Pope again.
[S&S]
But on October 5, Walesa received word he had been awarded the prize. To counter the government’s portrayal, he announced he was giving his money to the Church. On his deathbed, Yuri Andropov, who had succeeded Brezhnev, could hardly contain his fury, but Jaruzelski was unmoved.
“A month later he wrote a remarkable letter to John Paul II saying that he still often thought of their conversations during his visit to Poland because, ‘regardless of understandable differences in assessment, they were full of heartfelt concern for the fate of our motherland and the well-being of man.” [S&S]
In April 1984, following Andropov’s death, Jaruzelski told foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and defense minister Ustinov that the Church was an ally, without whom progress is impossible.
As previously stated, the Kremlin had been relying on a bluff since 1980; that military intervention was a certainty unless there was order. And so with the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev (after Andropov’s and Konstantin Chernenko’s deaths), he told Eastern European leaders that they could no longer rely on the Red Army to rescue them if they fell out of favor with their people. The leaders didn’t want to share this secret with the public but it was just a matter of time before folks put two and two together. But typical of Gorbachev, who was incredibly na ve, he didn’t understand he was also supplying the opening to the end of the Communist era in Eastern Europe. “He expected the hardliners, when they could hold out no longer, to be succeeded by a generation of little Gorbachevs anxious to emulate the reforms being introduced in Moscow. Few peacetime miscalculations have had such momentous consequences. Once a new crisis arose within the Soviet Bloc and it became clear that the Red Army would stay in its barracks, the ‘Socialist Commonwealth’ was doomed.” [S&S]
By the beginning of 1989, Poland’s economy was in poor shape and labor unrest was spreading. Solidarity was still banned but Jaruzelski felt he had to seek its help in the hopes of keeping the peace. Solidarity was re-legalized and Jaruzelski had the constitution changed to give the union a voice in general elections set for June. But while the Polish leader thought he had rigged the process to give Solidarity only a minor seat at the table, Lech Walesa and his movement swept to victory, winning all 161 available seats in one chamber of the revised parliament, while taking 99 of 100 in the other. The result stunned the world. “Our defeat is total,” Jaruzelski told party leaders.
Jaruzelski was still able to take the newly created presidency position for himself, but Solidarity was getting the prime minister’s post. Walesa could have had this but he was afraid the Communists remaining in parliament would make it too difficult for him due to his world celebrity; so Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the editor of Solidarnosc, was selected, thus becoming the first noncommunist prime minister in Eastern Europe in 40 years. The rest of the Soviet Bloc would soon follow and a year later, Walesa defeated his former advisor for the presidency.
And it all started with a labor movement in a shipyard.
Additional Source: “Lech Walesa: The Road to Democracy,” Rebecca Stefoff.
Next week, a look back at a key market peak, 9/1/00.
Brian Trumbore
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