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09/16/2004
Views on Iraq
[Hott Spotts returns 9/30]
Following are some selected thoughts of various strategists
concerning the war in Iraq, as revealed in the Summer 2004 issue
of The National Interest. I’m trying to give you a sense of both
sides of the debate and I chose authors I am already familiar
with.
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Dimitri K. Simes, president of the Nixon Center
“In order to deal effectively with America’s predicament in Iraq,
it is essential to understand that we had begun to walk down the
road to Baghdad long before September 11, indeed, quite before
the Bush Administration came to power. After the end of the
Cold War, a new triumphalist mindset, shared by influential
groups in both the Republican and Democratic parties, began to
develop an unstoppable momentum. It was Madeleine Albright
who started bragging about the United States being an
indispensable nation. It was a number of senior officials in the
Clinton Administration – and eventually President Clinton
himself – who, frequently taking a casual attitude to the facts,
brought the United States into the Balkans in a desire to
transform the former Yugoslavia – even if it required a military
action without UN blessing and in violation of international law,
as in the case of Kosovo.
“Some of these officials are now important advisors to John
Kerry. It is a bit disingenuous on their part to criticize the Bush
Administration for launching a campaign against Iraq for reasons
in many respects similar to those behind American attacks in the
Balkans – except that Slobodan Milosevic, unlike Saddam
Hussein, was not an enemy of the United States, was not
suspected of having weapons of mass destruction and harboring
international terrorists, and was less tyrannical than Saddam
Hussein, as his removal from power by democratic means has
demonstrated. And of course the Balkan wars took place before
9/11, which means they occurred in a context of much less
pressure to take pre-emptive action against potential threats
“It was also during the Clinton Administration, back in 1998,
that regime change in Iraq became official U.S. policy, having
been enthusiastically supported by a bipartisan congressional
majority.”
Today
“What we need to keep in Iraq in the long run is not a major
occupation force but a limited number of highly mobile units that
would allow us to go after any terrorists on Iraqi territory.
Policing Iraq, however, should become the responsibility of
others as soon as humanly possible – especially Muslim
nations (We) should learn the right lessons from our difficulties
in Iraq.
“We should learn to control our messianic instincts
“(As) long as freedom marches forward because of choices states
make themselves (America) can provide gentle encouragement.
But we are demonstrably less secure when our pro-democracy
zealotry creates a global backlash that alienates friends, confuses
allies and adds new recruits to the ranks of our enemies.
“Accordingly, we should – being true to our American heritage –
encourage freedom worldwide, but we should stop the export of
democracy which puts the United States on a collision course
with most of the world, interferes with the sovereignty of other
nations and complicates our War on Terror and the proliferation
of WMD.”
William E. Odom, Lt. Gen. (retired), U.S. Army
“The United States should begin a strategic withdrawal from Iraq
now because it was never in the interest of the United States to
invade that country in the first place. The mood in the United
States before the war, created by the Bush Administration and
supported by both parties in Congress, made a serious public
discussion of the prudence of the invasion impossible. One year
later, however, such an examination is difficult to avoid because
the president and his aides assured us that the Iraqis themselves
would greet U.S. forces as liberators and form a liberal
democratic regime friendly to the United States in a very short
time – months, not years .
“My arguments for withdrawal fall into roughly four categories.
First, the question of war aims and whose strategic interests were
served. Second, the argument that ‘liberal’ democracy cannot be
created soon, if ever, in Iraq, but ‘illiberal’ democracy can and
probably will be. Third, the implications for the United States of
continuing to pursue the war. And fourth, I discuss how to
reframe and address the strategic challenge the Greater Middle
East presents, not just to the United States but also to allies in
Europe and East Asia, including the unfinished war with Al-
Qaeda.
“President Bush has not always been consistent about American
war aims in Iraq, but he has repeated three too often to deny:
--Destruction of WMD in Iraq
--Overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his regime
--Creation of a pro-U.S. liberal democratic regime in Iraq
“Fighting terrorism has been mixed and muddled with these three
goals, but it should not be included, given that there is little or no
evidence of Saddam’s Iraq supporting terrorist groups in general
and Al-Qaeda in particular. [Ed. I don’t agree with this.]
“Achieving the first aim was a hollow victory since no WMD has
been discovered in Iraq. Second, Saddam is now in U.S. custody
and his regime overthrown. Thus two of the three war aims have
been accomplished. But the illusive third aim recedes daily like
the horizon. That said, achieving the first two war aims has not
necessarily served the American interest. Yet they have
benefited the interests of America’s foes. The destruction of
Saddam’s regime serves Iran’s aim of sweet revenge for Iraq’s
invasion in 1980.
“Four of Osama bin Laden’s interests have also been served.
First, he has long been dedicated to toppling secular Arab
leaders. Second, Iraq is now open to Al-Qaeda as a base of
operations, especially if an Islamic regime emerges there – a
likely outcome. Third, the invasion has distracted the United
States from its campaign against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and
northern Pakistan. Fourth, the war has put the United States at
odds with its European allies .
“Thus Bin Laden and the Iranians have been the winners thus
far .
“The implications of continuing the fight in Iraq can be divided
into those within the country, within the region and, finally,
globally.
“In Iraq: U.S. military forces may exhaust the remnants of the
Ba’ath but that will not overcome Shi’a groups like Moqtada
Sadr’s militia. Shi’a can count on support from Iran because that
country will take great pleasure in seeing American blood flow
in Iraq. Sunni groups may also receive outside aid from
supporters in Syria for similar reasons .
“In the region: So-called moderate Arab leaders are deeply
conflicted. On the one hand, most of them are glad to see
Saddam defeated. On the other hand, their own youth are being
radicalized. We should not exaggerate what the so-called ‘Arab
street’ will do, but we should worry about where Arab oil money
will end up and to what purposes it will be put .
“In the global contest: The U.S. unilateral initiation of the war in
Iraq has come close to breaking the Atlantic Alliance. Gaining
an Iraq of any form is not worth losing Europe. If the United
States is to maintain some kind of regional stability in the Middle
East and Southwest Asia, it cannot do it alone .
“To regain international support and to have the resources of our
allies available for a comprehensive strategy toward the region,
the United States will have to produce a highly positive outcome
in Iraq or withdraw. Since we are reasonably sure that a positive
outcome is impossible, and certainly decades away in the best
event, withdrawal is the most sensible course today.
“Our military investment in Iraq is what economists call a ‘sunk
cost.’ We cannot retrieve it by investing more there, no matter
how much. Thus, to say that we cannot afford to fail is a costly
illusion. We ensured failure when we decided to invade. Our
choices now are to get out of Iraq early, regroup with our allies,
and try to stabilize the region, or to continue down the present
path in Iraq and risk the dissolution of the American-led
international order.”
Niall Ferguson, professor and senior fellow at Hoover Institute
“As many as 50 percent of voters say they would like to see
American troops wholly or partially withdrawn from Iraq, and
soon. The starting point for any serious analysis of America’s
predicament must be that this is not a serious option. Sometimes,
to borrow a more recent British catchphrase famously used by
Margaret Thatcher, there is no alternative. That lady was not for
turning. This president must make sure that the wind blowing
through the nation’s capital doesn’t turn him either.
“First, let’s refresh our collective memory. It was right to
overthrow Saddam Hussein; the biggest defect of American
policy towards Iraq was that the task was left undone for twelve
years. The Bush Doctrine of pre-emption is eminently sensible
and has good historical precedents .
“So what went wrong? We all need to admit that mistakes have
been made, some of them grave. I count seven.
“1. In planning for a war to topple Saddam, Secretary Rumsfeld
did a brilliant job. But in planning for the peace that would
follow, he did a dreadful job. The wild overoptimism on the part
of key Washington decision-makers about the way Iraqis would
welcome an American occupation was inexcusable .even
Tommy Franks anticipated getting troop levels down to 50,000
after just 18 months .
“2. In arguing that Saddam Hussein definitely possessed
weapons of mass destruction, Vice President Dick Cheney, CIA
Chief George Tenet and ultimately George W. Bush himself – to
say nothing of Prime Minister Tony Blair – did us all a
disservice. It would have been perfectly sufficient to have
argued that, after all his obfuscations, it was impossible to be
sure whether or not Saddam Hussein possessed WMD. On that
basis, the war could have been adequately justified on the
precautionary principle. But when Cheney declared that
‘Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction,’ he
was going far beyond a legitimate interpretation of the available
intelligence. The subjunctive exists for a reason. He might have
possessed them; we simply didn’t know. By claiming we did
know, Cheney gave America’s critics a hostage to fortune .
“3. Diplomacy can proceed on more than one track, but the
tracks need to run in the same direction. With respect to the role
of the United Nations, the Bush Administration went down two
completely opposing tracks. One (Cheney’s) was to regard the
UN as irrelevant. The other (Powell’s) was to regard it as
indispensable. One or other of these policies might have been
successful. But a hybrid of the two was bound to fail .
“4. It was probably unwise to flout the Geneva Convention at
Guantanamo Bay; it was certainly fatal to indicate to military
prison warders that it could be flouted in Iraq as well. We have
since reaped the whirlwind sown by those decisions. Evidence
of torture and gratuitous abuse at Abu Ghraib have done more
than anything to discredit the claim of the United States and its
allies – introduced as a subsidiary casus belli rather late in the
day – to stand for human rights and the rule of law.
“5. It was a mistake to set a June 30 deadline for the handover of
power to an Iraqi government. The moment that deadline was
set, the incentives for ordinary Iraqis to collaborate with the CPA
became much weaker.
“6. It was a blunder not to let the Marines finish off the Ba’athi
rump at Fallujah. Nothing could have done more to affirm the
credibility of American arms. Now it has been established that if
you hole up in a city with enough guns and RPGs, the United
States will negotiate with you. It may even try to co-opt you.
“7. Finally, it was madness to execute a volte face and call in the
United Nations in the belief that it might help legitimize the
handover of sovereignty. All that UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi
has done so far has been to undermine the credibility of the quite
adequate system established by CPA administrator L. Paul
Bremer. What was wrong with the Iraqi Governing Council?
What was wrong with the basic law upon which it (miraculously)
managed to agree? .
“It was a famous anthem of the Vietnam generation: The answer,
my friend, is blowin’ in the wind. The wind that is blowing in
Washington today is not the kind of wind Bob Dylan had in
mind. It is a wind not of change but of panic – a wind that would
take America back to the failed tactics of appeasement, brokering
and containment that have yielded such dismal results in the
Middle East since the beginning of the Islamist revolution in
1979.”
Yevgeny Primakov, former prime minister and foreign minister
of Russia
“As a result of the failure of a policy of ‘unilateral regulation’ of
the crisis in Iraq, the United States has undertaken a course
toward greater involvement of the United Nations in the process
of stabilizing Iraq. This turnabout, something that President
Bush assiduously avoided at the start of the Iraqi operation, is
now considered by Washington as a device that will, first,
diminish criticism of the United States for its illegitimate use of
force in Iraq and, second, to gain the political and financial
support of many of the UN’s members. Under conditions of
increasing antiwar sentiments among the American population
prior to the election season, moving toward the UN helps
increase George W. Bush’s freedom of maneuver.
“It is clear that the international community is interested in a
rapid stabilization of the situation, as well as in the formation of
a government in Iraq that would be run by Iraqis. In this regard
it is important to take into account the fact that this is not
achievable in the context of an abrupt departure of American
forces unless its mission has first been transferred to the United
Nations – a fact Russia understands very well.
“Russia has an interest in Washington returning to a position of
collective action in dealing with crisis situations, rejecting the
unilateralism that has been on display in Iraq. But Moscow
understands that this can happen not through a crushing defeat of
the United States in Iraq, but by the evolutionary turnaround of
the Bush Administration toward involving the United Nations.
This has already begun, and the essence of Russian policy is to
encourage it forward.
“In support of this, Russia’s relationship with the European
countries is of vital importance. During the last Iraqi crisis
Europe was essentially divided between those who supported the
U.S. military action and those who were opposed. Games based
on these disagreements, however, are counterproductive.
Russia’s role might be to encourage European Union member-
states, especially France and Germany, to take a position that
combines their negative attitude towards the unilateral use of
force with active support of collective efforts to stabilize the
situation in Iraq using the mechanism of the United Nations.
Such actions should be developed in cooperation with the United
States. The development of such a consensus should evolve
under the aegis of the United Nations in order to solve the
problem of legitimacy and to establish the authority of the
operation to reconstruct Iraq.
“It would be especially useful to utilize a collective effort to
identify those forces in Iraqi society to whom power could be
transferred – and such a collective effort to locate these forces
could take the form of an international conference on Iraq.”
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There you have it. Differing opinions. I’ll save mine for “Week
in Review.”
Out of town next week on a little American history tour. Hott
Spotts will return September 30.
Brian Trumbore
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