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01/19/2006
How We Got to This Point
Timeline of the Iranian Nuclear Crisis
August 2002: An Iranian exile opposition group, the National
Council of Resistance of Iran, accuses Tehran of hiding a
uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy-water plant at
Arak.
February 2003: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Director-General Muhammad el-Baradei visits Iran to verify
Tehran’s claims that its nuclear program is peaceful. IAEA
inspectors later find traces of highly enriched uranium at Natanz
and other sites.
June 2003: IAEA begins a fresh round of inspections in Iran.
September 2003: The United States says Iran is in
noncompliance with the NPT and calls for a referral to the UN
Security Council, which could impose sanctions. But
Washington agrees to support a proposal from Great Britain,
France, and Germany (who were negotiating on behalf of the
European Union and became known as the “EU-3”) to give
Tehran until the end of October to fully disclose nuclear
activities and allow for a stricter inspection regime.
October 2003: The foreign ministers of France, Germany, and
Great Britain travel to Tehran and persuade Iran to agree to stop
enriching uranium and to sign the Additional Protocol to the
NPT. The EU-3 also dangle economic concessions if Tehran
cooperates fully with the IAEA. Iran turns over a declaration to
the IAEA admitting to 18 years of covert atomic experiments,
including the unreported uranium enrichment, although it
continues to deny this was for a weapons program.
November 2003: An IAEA report states that at the moment there
is no conclusive proof that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.
The United States, seeking to have the matter sent to the UN
Security Council, dismisses the conclusion. The IAEA’s 35-
member board of governors passes a resolution sternly rebuking
Iran for covering up 18 years of atomic experiments, but does not
send the matter to the Security Council.
February 2004: Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan’s
nuclear program, says that he had provided atomic secrets to
Iran, Libya, and North Korea since the late 1980s. IAEA
inspectors notice similarities in designs and components for the
advanced P-2 centrifuge, adding to suspicions that Khan supplied
both North Korea and Iran with some nuclear know-how.
May 2004: Iran submits to the IAEA a 1,000-page report on its
nuclear activities.
June 2004: IAEA says that inspectors found new traces of
enriched uranium that exceeded the levels necessary for civilian
energy production.
July 2004: Iran says it has resumed production of parts for
centrifuges that are used for enriching uranium, but insists that it
has not resumed its enrichment activities. The announcement
appears to put the enrichment-freeze deal worked out between
Iran, the EU-3, and the IAEA in jeopardy.
September 2004: An IAEA report calls Iran’s claims about its
nuclear program “plausible,” but voices concern over Iran’s
decision to resume large-scale production of the feed material for
enriching uranium. Claiming enrichment is a “sovereign right,”
Iran refuses to accept an unlimited suspension and says it will not
stop manufacturing centrifuges. The IAEA gives Iran a 25
November deadline to reveal all its nuclear activities. Tehran
later announces that it has resumed large-scale conversion of
uranium yellowcake ore, a step toward uranium enrichment.
October 2004: The EU-3 again calls for Iran to suspend all
uranium-enrichment activities to avoid its case being brought
before the Security Council. The Europeans offer economic and
political incentives in exchange. The Iranian parliament passes a
bill approving the resumption of enrichment activities.
November 2004: Iran holds talks in Paris with the EU-3. On 14
November, Iran signs an agreement to suspend uranium
enrichment. The Europeans offer a series of political and
economic concessions in exchange. But at an IAEA board of
governors meeting from 25-29 November – which was set to
pass a resolution endorsing the deal and agreeing to monitor it –
Iran insists on an exemption for 20 centrifuges for research
purposes. Iran eventually backs down, but demands – and wins –
key changes softening the resolution in exchange. Most
importantly, the resolution describes the enrichment freeze as a
voluntary, rather than the legally binding commitment as both
the United States and the EU sought.
December 2004: Talks between Iran and the EU-3 over political
and economic concessions, in exchange for Iran making its
enrichment suspension permanent, are scheduled to begin on 13
December.
January 2005: IAEA inspectors visit the Parchin military site,
which is southwest of Tehran, to investigate allegations that the
military tested conventional explosives that can be used to
detonate nuclear weapons there.
February 2005: Iran and Russia sign an agreement on the return
of spent nuclear fuel to Russia for reprocessing and storage. This
measure is intended to eliminate the possibility that the materials
will be used for making nuclear weapons. Fuel delivery will take
place six months before the facility’s completion, which should
occur at the end of 2006.
April 2005: Supreme National Security Council Secretary
Hojatoleslam Hassan Rohani said on 30 April – after the
previous day’s negotiations in London with British, French, and
German representatives failed to yield substantive results –
Tehran is considering resumption of activities at the Isfahan
uranium conversion facility (UCF).
May 2005: Iranian officials repeat that activities at Isfahan UCF
will resume “soon,” but then Tehran agrees to wait for two
months after Iranian and EU officials meet in Geneva.
July 2005: President Khatami says on 19 July that Iran will not
forsake the right to produce nuclear fuel and the enrichment
suspension will not be permanent. He says on 27 July that
activities at the Isfahan UCF could resume in days, depending on
the concessions proposed at an Iran-EU meeting. “The system
has already made its decision to resume Isfahan’s activities,” he
said.
August 2005: Iran rejects the EU proposal, which includes
commercial and political cooperation in exchange for Iran’s
forsaking efforts to develop nuclear fuel.
2 September 2005: Members of the IAEA Board of Governors
receive a report on Iran’s nuclear activities. It notes that Tehran
has been less than forthcoming about some of its activities and
has been reluctant to provide access to some sites. “In view of
the fact that the agency is not in a position to clarify some
important outstanding issues after two and half years of intensive
inspection and investigation, Iran’s full transparency is
indispensable and overdue,” the report states. “Given Iran’s past
concealment efforts over many years – transparency measures
should extend beyond the formal requirements should include
access to individuals, documentation on procurement, and dual-
use equipment.”
17 September 2005: President Mahmud Ahmadinejad announces
the Iranian position on the nuclear issue at the UN General
Assembly. “Peaceful use of nuclear energy without possession
of nuclear fuel cycle is an empty proposition,” he said. He
expressed concern about the creation of a nuclear “apartheid,”
and he calls for a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East. “In
accordance with our religious principles, pursuit of nuclear
weapons is prohibited,” Ahmadinejad said. As a confidence-
building measure, Ahmadinejad said, Iran is willing to partner
with public and private groups in its uranium-enrichment
program. He added that Iran will continue to cooperate with the
International Atomic Energy Agency. However, he dismissed
promises that other countries will be the source of fuel for the
Iranian nuclear program.
24 September 2005: The IAEA governing board adopts a
resolution that says the nuclear watchdog, “after two and a half
years of intensive inspections,” remains unclear on “some
important outstanding issues.” “Iran’s full transparency is
indispensable and overdue,” it continues, adding that the agency
questions Iran’s motives for not declaring certain factors and
“pursuing a policy of containment.” The resolution does not
refer Iran to the UN Security Council, but it does hint at this
possibility by noting that some of the outstanding questions are
“within the competence of the Security Council. The resolution
was approved by a vote of 22 in favor, 1 against (Venezuela),
and 12 abstentions.
9 January 2006: Iranian officials confirmed that the country will
resume some nuclear research and development activities under
the supervision of the IAEA. “This nuclear research is not
illegal,” a government spokesman said. “The suspension of
(nuclear fuel research) was a voluntary issue. We have
announced this to the IAEA and research activities will resume
today, with the presence of representatives of the agency, as
scheduled.”
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Copyright © 2006. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission
of Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave.,
N.W., Washington, DC 20036. www.rferl.org
[Special thanks to Andy Heil at RFE/RL]
Hott Spotts returns next week. Back to China.
Brian Trumbore
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