01/25/2007
The Other Side of the Debate
One of my favorite foreign policy strategists is Dimitri Simes, president of The Nixon Center and publisher of The National Interest, one of the publications I subscribe to.
In the Jan./Feb. 2007 edition, however, Simes lays into those of us still supporting the effort in Iraq and since I’ve presented the position of the proponents for a troop ‘surge’ recently, it’s only fair I present the other side of the debate as well.
Simes writes:
“Here they go again. After spending more than three years, the lives of 3,000 American soldiers, and well over $300 billion in Iraq, the coalition of neoconservatives and liberal interventionists who brought America into the quagmire now tell us that the problem was not with having the wrong war at the wrong time for the wrong reasons, but rather with poor implementation for which they unsurprisingly deny responsibility.
“And just as the Crusaders a millennium ago blamed their defeats in the Middle East on a lack of faith, we are told today that it is the realists – those heretics with an insufficient faith in the ability of American values and power to rapidly transform the world – who are poised to sabotage the entire project for spreading freedom throughout the region; that the realists and their false gods of stability and national interest will seduce Americans away from their true calling of spreading liberty throughout the world, even at the barrel of a gun.”
Harsh, but whereas I’m a self-described neocon, going back to the days before the Iraq War, I’ve also deviated significantly, as expressed in my “Week in Review” columns, with the Bush administration on issues such as the conduct of the war, Israel, Lebanon and Iran. Simes, for example, urges dialogue with Tehran and I concur. I also see a significant difference between Syria and Iran. Syria is a paper tiger Iran is dangerous.
Here, though, is what Simes says about dealing with Damascus and Tehran.
“Each has its own concerns, starting with non-interference in its domestic affairs, and neither is likely to offer any favors to America. It would be an exercise in futility to tell them that they should stop meddling in Iraq; allow the United States, France and Israel to play a decisive role in Lebanon; end support for Hamas and other radical Palestinian factions; and in the case of Iran, abandon its nuclear enrichment program, without both offering something important in return and subjecting them to strong international pressure.
“This brings us to the Palestinian problem. The reason to address the Palestinian problem is not that it would put an end to Shi’a and Sunnis killing each other in Iraq, make Bashir al-Assad an altruist in Lebanon, or persuade the mullahs in Tehran to abandon their nuclear ambitions. Rather, as every moderate Arab leader in the region has told the United States, the perceived American double-standard on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute makes it much more difficult for them to support U.S. positions or to do essential heavy lifting on America’s behalf on other issues. It also makes it harder for Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Assad to accommodate American concerns in Iraq and elsewhere without losing face in their own countries.”
Simes then talks about Russia, its UN veto, and the fact leading “European and Asian allies have indicated to Washington that without the cover of legitimacy the UN provides, they would be very reluctant to join any U.S. effort (against Iran and Syria).”
“Much is said, and sometimes with considerable justification, about Russia’s departure from democracy at home and its propensity toward applying heavy-handed pressure to its new neighbors. But publicizing Russia’s misdeeds, real and imagined alike, is not a substitute for achieving what is needed. The United States must either be prepared to bargain with a resurgent Moscow who cannot be intimidated or bribed as was done with Yeltsin’s Russia during the 1990s, or be prepared to pay the much higher costs for taking action without Russian cooperation .
“After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a period when the United States could act on the world stage without much opposition from other major states. Today, however, existing and emerging centers of power seem much less willing to delegate de facto world government to the United States – no matter who is in charge, whether Democrats or Republicans.
“Both Russia and China today accept that they need the United States more than they need each other – and this is especially true given China’s economic orientation. But if Moscow and Beijing believe that they are both being quietly encircled by the United States – either by NATO expansion further east or by some sort of global ‘democracy alliance’, they may change their calculations. They already appear to be hedging their bets in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. A Chinese-Russian axis would likely be tactical, taking into account their divergent interests and mutual distrust. But even temporary rapprochement could deliver a severe blow to U.S. global leadership. Throw in disaffected continental European powers and India, and a considerable dent could be placed in America’s ability to isolate rogue states, put effective pressure on nuclear proliferators and deprive non-state terrorist organizations of their indispensable protectors. Witness Iran’s faith in the ‘powers of the east’ to circumvent any American-initiated economic sanctions and to provide some counter-balance to the United States.
“Henry Kissinger has offered the wise observation that ‘so long as Iran views itself as a crusade rather than a nation, a common interest will not emerge from negotiations.’ But this observation is equally applicable to the United States. Many nations can embrace American world leadership, though obviously with different degrees of enthusiasm – if such leadership reinforces a global system based on free trade, secure lines of communication and a commitment to stability. Others might acquiesce more reluctantly – so long as they do not feel that America is engaged in a global crusade directed against them or at the expense of their vital interests.
“The stakes could not be higher. In his ground-breaking new book, ‘Annihilation from Within,’ Reagan Administration defense official and Washington wise-man Fred Ikle warns that ‘the dark side of progress’ – revolutionary new technologies of human destruction, whether nuclear, biological or even in artificial intelligence – has exceeded the development of the international system and the states within it. Ikle is concerned that ‘Living comfortably on borrowed time, most democratic societies lack the will and foresight needed to defend against’ the grave dangers that my come. September 11 may look trivial to what the United States and others may experience unless we focus on these apocalyptic threats, even at the occasional expense of desirable put optional pursuits. Moreover, notwithstanding ‘the appealing vision of a new ‘flat world’’, he writes, today’s globe is still dominated by states pursuing their individual interests. History will not judge kindly those who neglect a real and present danger to the survival of democracy in the United States and Europe in the name of promoting democracy on a global scale. And, Ikle makes a powerful case that the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction by non-state actors can create precisely such a disastrous outcome.
“The bottom line is that notwithstanding often disingenuous references to the ‘international community’, our dangerous world is still dominated by states and, yes, their governments. Under these circumstances, America cannot lead if it disregards the interests and priorities of others. Telling those others what we think their interests are does not work; sovereign nations like to make such decisions themselves. And when President George W. Bush is viewed as a greater threat to world peace than either Kim Jong-il or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (less a threat than Osama bin Laden alone), in major international polls, few abroad are inclined to accept that Washington knows best. It is not cynical defeatism but patriotic desire to strengthen U.S. global leadership that should persuade us to end the crusade. Now.”
Hott Spotts returns Feb. 8. Notes on Iran.
Brian Trumbore
|