06/07/2007
Well Under Control
Back on 4/19/07 in this space I wrote of how the terror threat in the Strait of Malacca, the body of water that bisects Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, was overrated, particularly in terms of non-existent links between terrorists and the more traditional pirates that ply the waters in the area.
So I read with interest a story on Monday from Agence France- Presse that Indonesia’s defense minister was calling on Japan, China and South Korea to help his cash-strapped nation secure the Strait. Again, I don’t think the threat, as we once feared, truly exists.
Then I read an essay in the May/June 2007 issue of Foreign Affairs by Dennis Blair, former Commander in Chief of U.S. Pacific Command, and Kenneth Lieberthal, Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan who also served on the National Security Council, which reiterates the world’s shipping lanes are safe.
First some facts.
Yes, the United States imports 60 percent of its oil, over 95 percent of which arrives by sea. Yes, Japan receives virtually all of its oil by maritime transport. Yes, China is importing 50 percent or so these days, India 70 percent, and for both, 90 percent of it by sea.
And, yes, 25 percent of total global oil shipments slice through the 21-mile-wide Strait of Hormuz, which leads out of the Persian Gulf into the Indian Ocean. Much of this oil bound for China, Japan, and the West Coast of the United States from the Middle East must also transit the Strait of Malacca.
But, as Blair and Lieberthal write, “in reality the risks to maritime flows of oil are far smaller than is commonly assumed. First, tankers are much less vulnerable than conventional wisdom holds. Second, limited regional conflicts would be unlikely to seriously upset traffic Third, only a naval power of the United States’ strength could seriously disrupt oil shipments, but the United States is more likely to protect shipping on the high seas than to do anything to endanger it. Fourth, if any country attempted to interfere with international shipping, a coalition would inevitably form to keep traffic flowing with manageable damage to oil deliveries and the global economy.”
What it boils down to is attacking commercial ships has only been effective when employed by major powers such as U.S. operations against Japan during World War II, or German operations against Allied shipping in the Atlantic during both world wars. Lesser naval powers simply don’t have the resources to carry it off.
Blair and Lieberthal cite the instructive example of the Iran-Iraq War, during which the two sides attacked each others interests with little real success. Commercial shipping in the Gulf initially declined 25 percent, but then the United States and others offered protection for neutral states and the tanker war ended up impacting about 2 percent of the traffic passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
And the size and strength of the global tanker fleet has increased considerably since 1980. For starters, single-hulled tankers are being phased out in favor of double-hulled ones. Conventional warheads are also far less effective against large modern tankers. Mines have little impact, thanks in no small part to “the protective effect of the liquid petroleum they carried (petroleum is not explosive in the airless tanks, and its weight holds the hulls in place).” [An important principle when discussing the JFK terror plot, designed to hit the pipelines.] Warheads that land on a tanker deck also do little damage.
As for Iran today, yes, it could disrupt traffic for a spell by the use of Chinese Silkworm missiles and patrol boats, as well as high-speed boats packed with explosives to ram oil tankers. But to do so then interferes in the shipping of neutral nations and soon you’d have a coalition of those with an interest to keep the free flow of oil. Let’s face it as I’ve written in my “Week in Review” column, this is one fear in the marketplace today that is greatly overrated. Terror groups could achieve little more in this realm as well.
But Blair and Lieberthal, while correctly adding “the U.S. Navy has no rivals today in its capacity to impose and sustain such blockades,” greatly understate China’s ability to catch up, saying it and others such as India, Japan and Russia are “at least 20 years away from developing the fleet strength, naval-supply networks, and operational skills needed to mount sustained blockades far from their home ports.” In the case of Beijing, I’d say it’s more like 10, and there’s a topic that’s been bothering me more and more these days .Micronesia. The United States is willingly giving it up and as I have personal experience here it’s troubling and a major mistake on the foreign policy front.
Blair and Lieberthal don’t mention Micronesia but when they state China won’t have “naval-supply networks” for 20 years, they could be wrong. I know one place, Yap, that China is working its way into now and this could be a critical staging area some day. I’ll have more in an upcoming “Week in Review” column. For today, suffice it to say that I’m disturbed my packages to my friends on Yap are no longer treated as U.S. mail as they once were. These poor, yet highly strategic islands, are up for grabs and China is taking advantage of this.
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Hott Spotts will return in two weeks. I need to work on some other projects over the coming months so this column will probably be every two weeks for a spell.
Brian Trumbore
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